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CRIMINAL LAW
BEYOND RETROACTIVITY TO REALIZING
JUSTICE: A THEORY ON THE PRINCIPLE
OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING
SHAHRAM DANA*
If an international court were to be set up, it would be unwise to give it the very
wide power to determine the penalty to be applied to each crime.
-Mr. Carlos Salamanca Figueroa, International Law Commission (1954)
Only the innocent deserve the benefits of the principle of legality. This
assertion naturally offends our notions ofjustice. It would be unacceptable
for a legal system to institutionalize such an approach. Yet, in the context
of prosecuting mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, international criminal justice mechanisms appear to be resigned to
such a principle, if not openly embracing it. Although ranking among the
most fundamental principles of criminal law, nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without law) receives surprisingly little attention in
international criminal justice. Indeed, it may be considered the "poor
cousin" of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law), which has
attracted far greater consideration. Whereas nullum crimen addresses the
punishability of the conduct in question, nulla poena deals with the legality
of the actual punishment or penalty itself Given that both are at the core of
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Former Associate Legal
Officer at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. I
am grateful to Roger Clark, Mark Drumbl, Stanley Fisher, Menno Kamminga, Andre Klip
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the principle of legality, the neglect of nulla poena sine lege is difficult to
justify, although not without explanation. As one prominent scholar
observes, nulla poena "affects only proven criminals" while nullurn crimen
"protects the mass of respectable citizens." While most criminal justice
systems have made considerable efforts to close this gap over the years,
international criminal justice has not. The potential contribution of nulla
poena sine lege has been overlooked on the international level by policy
makers, drafters, and judges. Likewise, there exists a lacuna in academic
scholarship on this subject. Under-theorization of nulla poena in
international criminal justice stalls the maturation in international law of
this longstanding criminal law principle, keeps dormant its contribution to
justice, and challenges the legitimacy of international punishment.
This Article aims to redress this imbalance by (1) developing the
normative content of nulla poena sine lege under international law; (2)
critically evaluating the statutes of international criminal courts and their
sentencing jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes; and (3) advancing a theory for understanding the role and potential
contribution of nulla poena to international justice. I argue for an
understanding of nulla poena that goes beyond its simple caricature as a
principle of negative rights, designed merely to prevent retroactive
punishment, to one that captures its full contribution to justice, including
equality before the law, consistency in punishment, and legitimacy in
international prosecutions. By advancing an international standard for
nulla poena sine lege, I hope to lay a foundation on which international
sentencing can more readily achieve the goals of the international
community in prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of mass atrocities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Only the innocent deserve the benefits of the principle of legality.
This statement naturally offends our notions of justice. It would be
unacceptable for a legal system to institutionalize such an approach. Yet, in
the context of prosecuting mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, international criminal law appears to be resigned
to such a principle, if not openly embracing it. Although ranking among the
most fundamental principles of criminal law, nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without law) has received surprisingly little attention in
international criminal justice. So little, in fact, that it may be considered the
poor cousin of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) which has
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attracted far greater consideration in scholarship and jurisprudence.1
Whereas nullum crimen sine lege addresses the punishability of the conduct
in question, nulla poena sine lege deals with the legality of the actual
punishment or penalty itself. Given that both are at the core of the principle
of legality,2 the neglect of nulla poena is difficult to justify, although not
entirely without explanation.3 As prominent legal scholar Jerome Hall
observed, nulla poena sine lege "affects only proven criminals" while
nullum crimen sine lege "protects the mass of respectable citizens."4
Commenting on the traditional approach of strict adherence to nullum
crimen combined with a cavalier attitude towards nulla poena, eminent
criminal law professor Paul Robinson observed that such a practice
"bestows the benefits of legality on innocent people and denies it only to
the criminals."5 While most national criminal justice systems have made
considerable efforts over the years to close this gap, international criminal
justice has not. The potential contribution of nulla poena has been largely
overlooked on the international level by policy makers, drafters, and judges.
Likewise, there exists a lacuna in academic scholarship on this subject.
Under-theorization of nulla poena in international criminal justice stalls the
maturation in international law of this long standing criminal law principle,
keeps dormant its contribution to justice, and challenges the legitimacy of
international prosecution and punishment.
1 See C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996) at 68-69;
S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996), at 41-42; M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1999);
MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES: NULLUM
CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2002); STANISLAW POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE
PRINCIPLE NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE (Elzbieta Chodakowska trans., 2d ed. 1975); L. C.
Green, The Maxim Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann Trial, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 457 (1962); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, It's No Defense: Nullum Crimen,
International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657 (1997); Mohamed
Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development
of Law?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2004); Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial
Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L. J. 119 (2008).
2 Susan Lamb, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 773, 773-74,
756 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Paul H. Robinson,
Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
393, 396-97 (1988); William A. Schabas, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 463, 463 (Otto Triffierer ed., 1999).
3 See generally Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice:
Some Latter-Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385 (1987).
4 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 55 (2d ed. 2005).
5 Robinson, supra note 2, at 398.
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This Article aims to redress this lacuna by (1) developing the
normative content of nulla poena under international law; (2) critically
evaluating the statutes of international criminal courts and their sentencing
jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; and
(3) advancing a theory for understanding the role and potential contribution
of nulla poena to international justice. The Article argues for an
understanding of nulla poena in international law that goes beyond its
simple caricature as a principle of negative rights, designed merely to
prevent retroactive punishment, to one that captures its role as a quality of
justice principle, aimed at realizing justice in the distribution of
punishment. This understanding of nullapoena is more in tune with its role
in national systems.
The study's methodology deconstructs the nulla poena maxim into its
underlying legal principles, examines sources of international law
pertaining to each principle, and then reconstructs an international nulla
poena maxim. The Article hypothesizes that a fuller appreciation of the
function and purpose of nulla poena, gained through an elucidation of its
underlying legal principles, can facilitate a more penetrating analysis of its
normative development in international law. Accordingly, Part II examines
the purpose of and interests protected by nulla poena and draws attention to
its modern function.6 The analysis then connects underlying attributes of
the maxim, formulated as legal principles, with its previously identified
function and purpose. This Part argues that the goal of nulla poena is not
merely to prevent retroactive punishment or abuse of power but also to
realize equality before the law and consistency in sentencing. The former
reflects a narrow understanding of nulla poena whereas the latter manifests
a modern approach.7
Part III investigates sources of international law in order to determine
the international standard for nulla poena through an analysis of
international and regional conventions, customary international law, general
principles of law, and international judicial precedent. Rather than giving a
blanket treatment of nulla poena under international law, this Part examines
sources of international law as they pertain to each underlying attribute.
Drawing upon this analysis, the Article advances an international standard
6 As the historical development of nulla poena sine lege has been covered by other
authors, it will not be further revisited here. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 127-35. See
generally CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THE HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW (Thomas
S. Bell trans., Rothman Reprints 1968) (1916); POMORSKI, supra note 1; Jerome Hall, Nulla
Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937); Aly Mokhtar, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine
Lege: Aspects and Prospects, 26 STATUTE L. REV. 41 (2005).
' The broader approach to nulla poena is here also referred to as its "positive justice"
dimension or "quality of law" function. See infra notes 14 & 16 (discussing a broader
approach).
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for nulla poena integrating the particularities of international law with the
requirements of criminal justice.
In Part IV, the Article moves its examination of nulla poena into the
context of international criminal justice. This Part begins with a critical
analysis of the statute and case law of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).8 The treatment of nul!a poena by the
ICTY is examined against the backdrop of the analysis developed in Parts II
and III. Next, the Article critiques the provisions of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) 9 pertaining to nulla poena and
sentencing. Here, the Article elucidates the strengths and weaknesses of the
ICC Statute in light of the international standard for nulla poena and its
potential contribution to international criminal justice. The Article
concludes that while one of the rationales underlying nulla poena, for
example preventing retroactive punishment, may not raise serious concerns
for international punishment of individuals guilty of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide, this does not mean that nulla poena has
lost relevance to international criminal justice. Other rationales underlying
the maxim, in particular those connected with its positive justice function,
such as equal treatment before the law, consistency in sentencing, and
improving the quality of justice, continue to require a rethinking of the role
of nulla poena in advancing international law and justice.
II. THE NATURE OF NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
A. VALUES: INTERESTS PROTECTED AND PURPOSES SERVED
Nulla poena sine lege and its counterpart, nullum crimen sine lege,
serve as the bedrock of the principle of legality. They protect one of the
most treasured individual rights of all-the right to liberty. In legal
positivism, their emergence is connected with the struggle against the
8 The "International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991" was established by the U.N. Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in 1993 pursuant to Resolution 827. See
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS 53
(Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 3d ed. 2005).
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 1,
2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute]; United Nations: Rome Statute of the Criminal Court, 37




dangers of unbridled and absolute power.'" They developed alongside other
doctrines, such as trias politica, that were likewise designed to curb abuses
of centralized power, although their application is not theoretically limited
to that particular form of government." In a trias politica system, the
principle of legality places obligations and limitations on the powers of all
three branches of the government. For example, they oblige the law-
making body to define as precisely and clearly as possible the penalty
applicable to a particular crime, including the form and severity of the
punishment. They place on the judiciary the obligation to limit sanctions to
those explicitly provided for by the legislature and prohibit judges from
applying penalties retroactively. It may even be argued that nulla poena
requires the judiciary to articulate reasons in support of the selected
penalty. 12
Nulla poena protects interests similar to those protected by nullum
crimen.13 First, it protects an individual's interest in being free from abuse
of power leading to loss of life, liberty, or property. For example, nulla
poena protects an individual's right to liberty by requiring codified limits
on the length of imprisonment. Second, it safeguards the principle of fair
notice. Fairness and justice in the administration of criminal law demand
that individuals know, or at least have the opportunity to know, the specific
consequence for violating a particular law. Nulla poena serves this purpose
by making the punishment for a crime foreseeable. In most national
systems, this is expressed through codified penalty ranges for each crime.
Another interest protected by nulla poena is legal certainty. Legal
certainty may be considered the sum of the first two interests. However,
society's interest in legal certainty and modern justifications for respecting
10 See also Hall, supra note 6, at 165-72; Mokhtar, supra note 6.
11 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 270-80 (1996); Hall, supra note 6, at
167-70; see also FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 20-22, 179-80 (1994) (noting the relevance of nulla poena sine
lege and nullum crimen sine lege in Islamic legal traditions).
12 At least one judge of the ICTY Appeals Chamber voiced concern in this regard,
remarking that ICTY judgments "should be more elaborate on the reasons as to how a
Chamber comes to the proportional sentence." Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-
A, Separate Opinion of Justice Schomburg, I (Sept. 17, 2003). Upon entering new
convictions on appeal, the Appeals Chamber doubled the sentence without providing any
substantive reasoning as to how it determined the new penalty. Id. at Judgment, 264.
13 See In re Rauter, Spec. Crim. Ct., The Hague (May 4, 1948), reprinted in H.
LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 526,
542-43 (1949) (recognizing two interests protected by nulla poena: legal security and
individual liberty); see also, Robinson, supra note 2, at 396-97 ("The rationales that support
precise written rules governing assignment of liability and its degree apply as well to
criminal sentencing.").
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nulla poena are broader than the goals of providing notice and preventing
abuse of power, and include, for example, justice in the distribution of
punishment and consistency in sentencing. 14 The fact that nulla poena sine
lege has outgrown its "negative" justice dimension" and developed a
"positive" justice attribute' 6 is evidenced by movements in various
countries to reform sentencing laws, which began in the 1970s and built
momentum over the last two decades. 17 Undertaken in both civil law and
common law countries, these reforms in sentencing policy transcend the
traditional dichotomy between adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems. 18
One common element emerging from the movements is that, in undertaking
these reforms, the concern of policymakers is not that the state has
abusively employed its power against individuals, but rather the concern
has been to achieve justice and equal treatment in sentencing.19 This
reflects a broader approach to nulla poena sine lege.
14 The common trends in reform of domestic penal policy, for example in the United
States during the 1950s and 1960s with the proclamation of the Model Penal Code and again
in the late 1980s with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in Scandinavian countries in the
1970s, and in Eastern European countries following the Cold War, all suggest constant and
increasing movement towards placing greater emphasis on the values protected by the
"positive" features of nulla poena sine lege. For further contemplation of the broader
relevance and importance of nullapoena sine lege, see Allen, supra note 3, at 385-412.
15 For example, the prevention of abuse of power and application of retroactive penalties.
16 Take, for example, equality before the law, consistency in sentencing, proportionality,
and predictability. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 394 ("While commentators do not always
include it as a traditional purpose of the legality principle, another important effect is to
assure some degree of uniformity among decisionmakers-both judges and juries-in
imposing criminal sanctions in similar cases.").
17 See Daniel B. Pickard, Note, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International
Criminal Court, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 123, 126 (1997).
18 The 1976 revisions of the Finnish Penal Code provide an illustrative example of such
reforms in a civil law system. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1991)
(containing examples of reforms in a common law system); Pickard, supra note 17; Bill
Mears, Rehnquist Slams Congress Over Reducing Sentencing Discretion, CNN.coM, Jan. 1,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/01/rehnquist.judiciary/ (reporting the reaction by
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court). The author acknowledges that some
national systems face an ongoing debate about how much discretion to give judges.
Moreover, it is not the author's intention to advocate a blanket endorsement of the methods
underlying the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the purpose of international
sentencing.
19 In recent reforms of domestic penal policy, greater emphasis has been placed on the
positive values protected by nulla poena. For example, in the mid-1970s, Finland started
reforming its criminal justice system, focusing on legal security, proportionality,
predictability, and equal treatment. See Pickard, supra note 17. Significantly, in the context
of international criminal justice, current and former judges of the ICTY have expressed
concern that lack of consistency in international sentencing may undermine confidence in
international prosecutions. Rachel S. Taylor, Sentencing Guidelines Urged, INST. WAR &
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Accordingly, a modem approach to the principle of legality appreciates
nulla poena's utility for not only limiting judicial authority, but also
safeguarding it by preventing factors such as popular prejudice, political
pressure, or immediate public opinion from influencing the sentence. It
partly restrains these potential threats to justice in sentencing as well as the
appearance of such an influence. Thus, in addition to safeguarding the
rights of a defendant, nulla poena also protects the integrity of the criminal
justice process. It provides a legal framework in which consistency in
sentencing can be more readily achieved in practice. By creating a statutory
framework for penalties, nulla poena actually preserves judicial
independence, safeguarding judges from pressures arising from non-legal
influences. In short, a broad approach to nulla poena sine lege, in tune with
its modem development and recognizing its characteristic as a quality of
justice principle, affords several interconnected benefits including
advancing consistency in sentencing, safeguarding judicial authority,
protecting the integrity of criminal justice, and upholding justice in the eyes
of the public.
B. ATTRIBUTES: LEGAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING NULLA POENA
The extent of protection accorded to these interests depends in part
upon the degree of adherence to four attributes of nulla poena sine lege.
They consist of two threshold requirements on the quality of criminal law
and two prohibitions on its application.20 The threshold requirements are
expressed in the legal principles of lex scripta (punishment must be based
on written law) and lex certa (the form and severity of punishment must be
clearly defined and distinguishable). The two prohibitions can be described
as lex praevia (the prohibition against retroactive application) and lex
stricta (the prohibition against applying a penalty by analogy).
As to the quality of law, lex scripta and lex certa work in tandem and
are recognized requirements of nulla poena in most legal systems.21
PEACE REPORTING, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.iwpr.net/?p-tri&s=f&o=166179&apc state=
henitri2004.
20 BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 123-26; Hall, supra note 6, at 165; Roelof Haveman, The
Principle of Legality, in SUPERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A SYSTEM Sul GENERIS 39, 40
(Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran & Julian Nicholls eds., 2003); Lamb, supra note 2, at 733-
66; see also, Boot, supra note 2, at 94-102. In commentaries on the principle of legality,
these four attributes have been discussed as they relate to the nullum crimen principle. They
are also useful in analyzing the substance of the nullapoena principle. As applied to nullum
crimen, these attributes address the punishability of a particular conduct. Applied to nulla
poena, they place limits and set standards for the punishment itself.
21 Haveman, supra note 20, at 40-43; see also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A
& IT-94-1-Abis, Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, 4 (Jan. 26, 2000) ("[T]he
nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali principle.., is generally upheld in most national legal
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Continental European legal systems interpret the lex scripta principle as
requiring penalties to be based upon codified laws (written laws provided
by the legislature).22  Although common law traditions historically
permitted "written law" to include judge-made law, the United States, in
addition to most common law countries,2 3 follows a continental law
approach to lex scripta, as evidenced by the practice of relying on statutory
law in the application of criminal penalties.2 4 Accordingly, it may be
concluded that lex scripta requires that the law, which is relied on by judges
for their legal authority to punish the accused, be written and provided for
by the legislature. Thus, nulla poena limits the use of custom for the
determination of a sentence. Here, nulla poena protects against abuse of
power and guards against the influence of prejudicial factors, such as
transient emotional outrage or politically charged motives. Lex certa
requires that the law authorizing the nature (form) and degree (severity) of
punishment be specific, definite, and clear. This includes specifying the
type of punishment that a judge is (and is not) authorized to impose on an
accused.25  It also requires the law to differentiate between the specific
maximum (severity) applicable to different crimes.26 Finally, it would
mean that the law of penalties should also distinguish between different
forms of participation in criminal conduct such as commission, attempt,
aiding and abetting, and so on. The majority of states follow this approach
in their domestic legal systems, and it typically includes the practice of
articulating a specific maximum penalty for each criminal offense. By
requiring definite and precise law on penalties, the lex certa requirement of
nulla poena sine lege protects the individual's interest in legal certainty.
Turning to the prohibition characterized as lex praevia, nulla poena
requires strict adherence to the principle of non-retroactivity as to the nature
and degree of the imposed punishment.2 7 It prohibits the imposition of a
systems .... Under this principle, for conduct to be punishable as a criminal offence, the
law must not only provide that such conduct is regarded as a criminal offence, but it must
also set out the appropriate penalty ....").
22 See Haveman, supra note 20, at 41.
23 Scotland is arguably a remaining exception. See id. at 41 n.6.
24 See id. at 41.
25 For example, death, incarceration, forced labor, fines, and so on.
26 Hereinafter referred to as either "precise," "specific," or "individualized" penalties.
By use of these terms herein, I mean the practice of providing a penalty range or maximum
penalty per crime. I do not argue for exact penalties (that is, for example, fifteen years
exactly for a particular crime, no more and no less). Moreover, while the law in the first
instance sets the outer limits of a penalty, the determination of the actual sentence within that
range in a given case is influenced by a number of factors. However, an analysis of all
sentencing factors is beyond the scope of the present contribution.
27 United Nations General Assembly, Mar.-Apr. & Aug. 1996, Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 189, U.N. Doc.
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penalty heavier than the one applicable at the time the crime was
committed. The principle of non-retroactivity is a fundamental feature of
any criminal justice system 28 and has been explicitly recognized in
international human rights declarations and treaties.29 Moreover, the lex
praevia attribute of nulla poena is consistently among the non-derogable
provisions of these international instruments, prompting some
commentators to argue that it ranks among the core human rights
protections.30 In the context of nullum crimen sine lege, writers from the
civil law tradition described the lex stricta element as a prohibition on
interpretation by analogy. 3' Jurists from the common law tradition explain
lex stricta, more generally, as the requirement of strict interpretation.32 This
includes the notion that penal statutes should not be extended to the
detriment of the accused. Accordingly, whereas the lex stricta component
of nullum crimen prohibits expansion of criminal laws by analogy to cover
conduct not within the law, the lex stricta attribute of nulla poena would
prohibit substituting an alternative penalty by analogy.33
A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report]; see also Schabas, supra
note 2, at 463.
28 The views expressed by states during the ICC preparatory meetings confirm this
principle as a primary feature of their national legal systems. See ICC Prep. Committee's
1996 Report, supra note 27, 189.
29 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A at 55, art.
15.1, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession on Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. For
regional international treaties, see African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights
art. 7(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African
Charter]; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
30 See Lamb, supra note 2, at 757.
31 BOOT, supra note 1, at 94, 100-02; Haveman, supra note 20, at 46-48.
32 See Hall, supra note 6, at 165.
33 In the Erdemovi case, an ICTY trial chamber succumbed to this type of interpretation
when it made comparisons between genocide and crimes against humanity. Discussed in full
infra Part IV(B). See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,
35-40 (Nov. 29, 1996). While most national legal systems allow for some judicial
discretion in the application of penalties, this discretion is strictly limited by legislative
parameters. As noted by one commentator, "only a few permit resorting to analogy outside
legislatively enacted penalties." See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 124.
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II. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS:
AN INCOMPLETE CODIFICATION?
According to some scholars, the principle of legality has been
"integrated into the concept of fundamental human rights in criminal
justice. '34 Regarding national legal systems, this proposition seems beyond
serious debate. The subject of particular interest here is the character and
content of nulla poena sine lege in international law and, more specifically,
in international criminal justice. When analyzing human rights instruments
for an understanding of the principle of legality in international law,
commentators typically begin with Article 11 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948):
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
35
Nearly identical language is found in several international and regional
human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966),36 the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (1950),
3 7
and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (1969). 38 Several
commentators consider the second sentence to represent the incorporation
of nulla poena sine lege in international law as a fundamental human rights
principle.39  This provision is consistently among the non-derogable
34 BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 265; see also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 358 (2d ed. 2005) (1993);
Schabas, supra note 2, at 463.
35 UDHR, supra note 29.
36 ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 15(1) ("[N]or shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."); see
NOWAK, supra note 34, at 358-68 (providing a general commentary on this article).
37 ECHR, supra note 29, art. 7(1) ("[N]or shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed."); see DAVID J. HARRIS,
MICHAEL O'BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 274-82 (1995) (providing a general commentary on Article 7).
38 ACHR, supra note 29, art. 9 (stating that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed); see also Jo M.
PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 2003).
39 See NOWAK, supra note 34, at 359. See generally KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
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provisions of these international human rights treaties.4" Moreover, all
three conventions codify the provision in an article separate from other
procedural guarantees in criminal law, indicating "its special significance
for criminal trials ... as well as for legal certainty in general. 'A1 Its
formulation further indicates that the international nulla poena sine lege
prohibits both retroactive and retrospective punishment.42
The text itself explicitly incorporates into international law one
attribute of nulla poena, namely the lex praevia principle: the prohibition of
ex post facto penal laws and retroactive application of penalties. The
European Court of Human Rights (European Court), however, held that this
provision includes the lex stricta prohibition against application of penalties
by analogy, as well as the lex certa attribute of nulla poena sine lege:
Article 7 embodies, inter alia, the principle that only the law can define a crime and
prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the
criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused's detriment, for instance
by analogy. From these principles it follows that an offence and the sanctions
provided for it must be clearly defined in the law.
43
Here, the European Court took a broad approach to nulla poena,
viewing it not merely as a protectionist principle but also as a quality of law
principle.44 Although the case involved a situation in which "it may be
40 See ICCPR, supra note 29; ACHR, supra note 29, art. 27(2); ECHR, supra note 29. It
also appears in international humanitarian law treaties. See e.g., Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75(4)(c), Aug. 12, 1949, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
41 NOWAK, supra note 34, at 358.
42 See Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD209
(1999); Welch v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD42 (1996).
"Retroactivity" generally refers to making a certain conduct, innocent at the time it was
performed, criminal and punishable after the fact, in other words creating a new crime ex
post facto; whereas "retrospectivity" refers to an ex post facto change in the legal effect or
consequence of a conduct that was already criminal. For further reading, see Bouterse Case,
Amsterdam Court of Appeals, Opinion of Professor C.J.R. Dugard, 8.4.5 (July 7, 2000) (on
file with author).
43 Ba~kaya v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, 36
(1999) (emphasis added).
4 This is consistent with the court's approach to Article 7 in general. For example, in
Kokkinakis v. Greece, the court interpreted the general scope of Article 7(1) to include the
principles of lex certa, lex scripta, and lex stricta in a case concerning the "punishability" of
the conduct. See App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 411 (1994) ("[Article 7(1)]
also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and
prescribe a penalty.., and the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively
construed to an accused's detriment, for instance by analogy; it follows from this that an
offence must be clearly defined in law."). However, in the context of national prosecutions,
the court ruled that Article 7 was not violated where the "punishability" of the conduct was
foreseeable in light of the interpretations of national courts. Problems with applying the
foreseeability test in the context of international law are addressed below.
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difficult to frame laws with absolute precision and [a] certain degree of
flexibility may be called for," the European Court did not hesitate to apply a
strict standard for nulla poena sine lege and rejected the use of analogy in
fixing a penalty even where nullum crimen sine lege had been respected.45
Likewise, leading commentators consider the nulla poena provision of
ICCPR Article 15(1), ECHR Article 7(1), and ACHR Article 9 as also
giving rise to the lex scripta (written law), lex certa (certain and
predictable), and lex stricta (prohibition of analogy) attributes of nulla
poena sine lege, in addition to explicitly incorporating lex praevia
(prohibition of retroactivity).4 6
The passive language of these provisions also leaves open to
interpretation the notion of "law." What "law" satisfies the lex scripta
requirement of nulla poena sine lege when determining the penalty
"applicable" at the time of the offense? 47 The European Court stated, obiter
dictum, that "[w]hen speaking of 'law' Article 7 alludes to the very same
concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that
term, a concept which comprises statutory as well as case-law." 48 In cases
dealing with the nullum crimen principle,49 the European Court has applied
the test of accessibility and foreseeability when determining whether the
45 Ba~kaya, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7 39,42.
46 See, e.g., NOWAK, supra note 34, at 359-60.
47 A few decisions address this question in interpreting the nullum crimen principle set
forth in the first clause of Article 7(1). See C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92,
335 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68-69 (1996); S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335 Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 41-42 (1996). In these cases, the European Court of Human Rights held that so
long as the law is "accessible" and "foreseeable," then the nullum crimen principle is
respected.
48 Ba~kaya, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36. Note, however, that in this case as well as in the
Welch and Adamson cases, the lex scripta principle was not directly in issue. The issue in
the latter two was not whether judge-made law could serve to satisfy the nulla poena
principle in Article 7(1), but whether the measure constituted a "penalty" within the meaning
of the Convention. The legislation in question in both cases was held to have retrospective
effects and therefore, if the measure was deemed to be punitive, it would be held to violate
the second clause of Article 7(1). Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur.
H.R. Rep. CD209, 1 (1999); Welch v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R.
Rep. CD42, 26-27 (1996). In Welch, the court held that the confiscation provision of the
Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986 were penalties within the meaning of Convention,
and therefore its retrospective application to the defendant violated the nulla poena sine lege
principle within Article 7. 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33-35. In Adamson, however, the majority
court held that the application was inadmissible because the challenged measure under the
Sex Offenders Act of 1997, although also resulting in retrospective consequences, did not
violate Article 7(1) because the measure was not a penalty. 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 7 1.
49 That is, whether the conduct in question is punishable in the first place, or in other
words whether the conduct falls within the scope of a criminal statute.
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conduct in question falls within the scope of a criminal statute.50 However,
caution should be taken before mechanically applying the foreseeability test
to penalties in international prosecutions. 51 First, international adjudication
accepts a wider range of sources of law than the two types referred to by the
European Court. In addition to treaty law, other sources of international
law include international custom and general principles of law.52 While the
court has given a liberal interpretation to the notion of "law," state practice
and opinio juris is presumably not what the court had in mind when
referring to "case-law." The diverse sources of international law and the
complexities surrounding international law-making processes challenge a
straightforward application of the accessibility and foreseeability test.
Second, the cases in which this test has been applied involved
prosecutions in which the conduct in question and the law applied arose in
the same forum. In international prosecutions, the applicability of this test
is complicated by the fact that the penalties are rendered in a forum far
remote from the locus delicti. If the law of the locus delicti prohibited the
application of a particular penalty, can that penalty still be considered
foreseeable? Should the "applicable penalty" be determined by the law of
the locus delicti or the law of the locus fori? The rulings of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on this
point have been controversial, if not contrary to the intent of the statute's
drafters.53 As will be discussed in detail in Part IV, through clever
stratagem, the ICTY avoided the intent of the drafters and effectively
marginalized punitive norms of the locus delicti, even one of its most
entrenched norms, the prohibition of life imprisonment, when laying the
foundations for its sentencing practice.5 4 Third, the foreseeability test arose
in cases dealing with the issue of punishability of conduct, and not the
50 C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); S.W. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); Kokkinakis v. Greece, App.
No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 411 (1994).
51 Some writers have no trouble relying on the nullum crimen cases to perfunctorily
apply the foreseeability test to a nulla poena analysis. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at
463. However, the fact that such authors do not cite cases where the court itself applies the
accessibility and foreseeability test to a nulla poena issue is revealing. The absence of cited
case law applying the test to penalties is neither surprising nor without possible explanation.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
52 These sources of international law are discussed in detail infra Parts 1II.13
(international custom) and III.C (general principles of law).
53 See infra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 75-80.
54 It would not be the last time that a trial chamber of the ICTY employs such tactics in a
matter concerning penalties. Recently, a trial chamber of the ICTY continued this
methodology in the interpretation of the principle of lex mitior. See Prosecutor v. Nikolid,
Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Dec. 18, 2003); infra Part IV.B.
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punishment itself. In other words, the court was addressing nullum crimen,
not nulla poena.
In fact, judgments by the European Court of Human Rights
interpreting nulla poena sine lege are scarce.55  The infrequency of
challenges itself suggests the entrenchment of the maxim in municipal law
and practice, as do the types of challenges among the few that have come
before the European Court. Typically, the challenged measure is found in
law passed by the legislature.56 This is not surprising and reinforces the fact
that most states address the issue of criminal sanctions exclusively through
written law in the form of legislative enactment.
57
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR
STRENGTHENING NULLA POENA SINE LEGE?
In addition to international treaties and conventions, international
custom may serve to inform the examination of nulla poena sine lege under
international law. When enforced through ad hoc tribunals or the
International Criminal Court (ICC), however, international criminal law
differs from other branches of public international law in that international
norms, standards, and rules are directly applicable to individuals.
Moreover, it contains a unique sanction-incarceration of a person-not
found in other areas of public international law which, unless exercised
lawfully and legally, constitutes a breach of international human rights
law. 58  Therefore, a customary rule in international criminal law must
satisfy the combined requirements of human rights law and general
55 See HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 37, at 274-75 ("Very few cases have
been admitted for consideration on the merits under Article 7.").
56 E.g., Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD209, 1
(1999); Welch v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD42, 9, 12
(1996).
57 This is true of the current practice of even common law traditions such as the United
Kingdom and United States. In both Welch and Adamson, the challenged measure was
found in a law passed by the legislature. In both cases, the State (the United Kingdom)
chose to approach the subject of criminal sanctions via a legislative act. In the United States,
almost all states have codified their penal laws and penal sanctions are specified by the
legislature.
58 The principal distinction between "lawful" and "legal" is that the former contemplates
the substance of the law while the latter pertains to the form of law. To say that an act is
"lawful" implies that it is authorized by the law, and to say that it is "legal" indicates that it
is performed in accordance with the forms and usage of law. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
885, 892 (6th ed. 1990).
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principles of criminal law.5 9  In this sense, international custom can
strengthen the rule of law in international criminal justice.
Pursuant to Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law" serves as an essential source of law for identifying international
standards. 60  "International custom" may be described as a general
recognition among States of a certain practice as obligatory. 61 There must
exist a degree of uniformity and consistency in the practice of states (i.e.,
state practice) accompanied with a view that conformity with the practice at
issue is obligatory (i.e., opiniojuris et necessitatis).62 Complete uniformity
in practice among states is not required.63 According to international law
scholars, a state's domestic practice, as expressed in its legislation,
constitutes appropriate evidence of state practice. 64 In other words, state
practice may be determined not only by the practice followed by states in
their external relations, but also the practice followed by states internally.65
An examination of criminal sanctions in national legal systems reveals
substantial and widespread uniformity in the practice of articulating specific
maximum penalties for each crime individually. 66  As noted above, the
criminal codes of most states contain specific maximums per crime or
category of crimes.67 As to the applicable penalty, they make distinctions
not only between types of crimes but also between completed crimes and
59 See also William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Criminal Tribunals: A
Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461 (1997) (arguing that sentencing in
international criminal law should measure up to contemporary human rights standards).
60 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1999 I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b).
61 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed., 2003); see
also George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM.
J. INT'L L. 541 (2005) (applying the model of a multilateral prisoner's dilemma to
demonstrate, as a rebuttal of critics, that it is plausible that states would comply with
customary international law under certain conditions).
62 BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 6-12.
63 See id. at 7; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (5th ed., Cambridge
University Press 2003) (1997).
64 BROWNLIE, supra note 6 1, at 8.
65 Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal
Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 587 (2002).
66 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94- 1-A & IT-94-l-Abis, Judgement, Separate
Opinion of Judge Cassese, 4 (Jan. 26, 2000) ("[T]he nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali
principle is generally upheld in most national legal systems .... Under this principle, for
conduct to be punishable as a criminal offence, the law must not only provide that such
conduct is regarded as a criminal offence, but it must also set out the appropriate penalty.");
see also supra, Part I1.
67 See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 162 (2001).
[Vol. 99
2009] BEYOND RETROACTIVITY TO REALIZING JUSTICE 873
inchoate crimes.68 Thus, the lex scripta and lex certa attributes of nulla
poena sine lege feature prominently in current state practice. Moreover, a
consequence of a system's adherence to these two principles of nulla poena
is that the need to resort to analogy naturally falls away. This indirect
affirmation of the lex stricta principle has obviated the need to codify
constitutionally the prohibition against punishing by analogy in many
national systems. The lex praevia attribute of nulla poena likewise
constitutes a fundamental principle of domestic legal systems and in many
cases has been codified in national constitutions or criminal codes. 69 As
stated by Theodor Meron, former President and judge of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the "prohibition of
retroactive penal measures is a fundamental principle of criminal justice,
and a customary, even peremptory, norm of international law that must be
observed in all circumstances by national and international tribunals. 70
Thus, state practice indicates that nulla poena sine lege contains strong lex
scripta, lex certa, lex stricta and lex praevia features.
On the other hand, after examining international conventions defining
international crimes, one may be tempted to conclude that international
practice suggests a lack of concern for adherence to lex scripta and lex certa
because international criminal law treaties do not contain provisions for
applicable penalties.7' Such a conclusion, however, would fail to take
account of the fact that these international treaties envisioned a system of
indirect enforcement whereby states would legislate precise maximum
68 See Pickard, supra note 17, at 141-62. Pickard provides a comparative overview of a
variety of crimes, including genocide, murder, rape, torture, assault, and others, for twelve
countries from diverse legal systems. The study indicates that each country makes the said
distinctions. These countries include Argentina, China, France, Nigeria, Romania, Russia,
United Kingdom, United States, India, Korea, Japan, Germany, Afghanistan, and Turkey.
69 The principle of non-retroactive application of penalties is widely adhered to in the
internal practice of states, and is considered a fundamental feature of a criminal law system.
See ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report, supra note 27, at 43; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 235, 290 (1993) [hereinafter Bassiouni Study].
70 THEODOR MERON, Ex Post Facto?, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 244, 244
(1998).
71 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 249, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS, supra note 8; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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penalties within the framework of their domestic criminal codes.72 These
treaties and conventions typically address only one aspect of substantive
criminal law. They usually do not contain provisions on general principles
of criminal law, such as principles of criminal liability, relevant defenses,
or, particularly relevant for our purposes here, specific penalties. Moreover,
the absence of an international forum, such as an international criminal
court with powers of direct enforcement, meant that articulating precise
penalties within the treaties was not a legal necessity.73 Interestingly, at the
preliminary stage of discussions on creating an international forum for the
prosecution of international crimes, this deficiency in international criminal
law conventions was noted by many states as falling short of adequate
respect for nulla poena sine lege.74 Therefore, it seems unwarranted to
conclude that state practice does not support the requirement for crime-
specific maximum penalties in accordance with nulla poena sine lege from
the mere fact that international criminal law treaties do not contain precise
penalties.
As to the question of opiniojuris, many states have expressed a sense
of legal obligation to act in accordance with nulla poena sine lege. During
the drafting of the ICTY statute, several states, presumably mindful of the
quality of law function of nulla poena, supported the application of national
penalties and norms which, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, excluded
life imprisonment as cruel and inhumane.75 For example, with the
exception of the death penalty, Italy, Russia, and the Netherlands explicitly
referred to national penalties in their proposals. The Netherlands expressed
the view that "[a]n appropriate sanction norm has to be created both for war
crimes and for crimes against humanity to be applied by the ad hoc tribunal.
In the opinion of the Netherlands this sanction norm should be derived from
the norms which were applicable under former Yugoslav national law."
76
72 BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 125-26; BASSIOUNI & MAN1KAS, supra note 11, at 689.
73 It is worth noting that within the legal framework of the European Union, supra-
national legal instruments which require Member States to criminalize certain acts also set
forth provisions instructing States as to the appropriate penalty. Although there is no
European criminal forum for prosecution, the so-called "minimum-maximum" provisions
require Member States to include in their enabling legislation a minimum and maximum
penalty.
74 E.g., Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.17 at 2 (Nov. 17,
1994) (discussing the ILC report on an international criminal court); ICC Prep. Committee's
1996 Report, supra note 27, at 63, T 304.
75 See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440-43 (1995).
76 Schabas, supra note 59, at 473 (citing Note Verbale from the Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands, to the Secretary-General, United Nations (Apr. 30, 1993)
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25716 at 5).
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The United States favored the adoption of sentencing guidelines. 77 Italy, in
a letter to the U.N. Secretary General, stated that "the need to respect the
principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, the basis of fundamental
human rights, has induced the Italian Commission to decide in favor of the
penalties set forth by the criminal law of the State of the locus commissi
delicti."78 In this expression of opinio juris, Italy decisively accepts the
binding nature of nulla poena even in international law. In other words, in
contemplating action at the international level, Italy's position is that states
are legally obligated to fully respect nulla poena when acting on a matter
within the principle's ambit. Thus, as to the content of the principle, Italy
affirmed the lex scripta and lex certa aspects of nulla poena sine lege at the
international level. Additionally, Italy characterized nulla poena as a
fundamental human right. Slovenia called for even greater certainty by
suggesting the inclusion of minimum as well as maximum penalties. 79 The
Organization of the Islamic Conference said that "the tribunal should
promulgate penalties before adjudicating cases, based on its statute and
general principles of law of the world's major legal systems." 80
Presumably, it had in mind something more than the final version of Article
24, which merely excludes the death penalty. Thus, among the states
making submissions on the issue, the overwhelming majority recognize a
nulla poena rule that is deeper and extends beyond merely the prohibition
of retroactive punishment.
Further insights on the views of states as to the appropriate quality and
character of nulla poena in international law can be gained from opinions
expressed by state delegations during preparatory meetings and negotiations
on the statute of the ICC. Numerous states voiced their opinion that
punishment for crimes must be in accordance with nulla poena sine lege.
81
Indeed, there was even broad agreement on this point.82 It was noted that
"the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege) required that penalties be
defined in the draft statute of the ICC as precisely as possible."83 Some
states also suggested that the punishment applicable to each offense, as well
as the enforcement of penalties, should be set forth in the ICC's statute.84
Moreover, states also widely expressed the view that adherence to
77 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 75, at 442.
78 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy, to the Secretary-General, United
Nations, at 1, art. 7 §§ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/25300 (Feb. 17, 1993) (emphasis added).
79 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 75, at 443.
8 d. at 441.
81 ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report, supra note 27, at 41.
82 Id. at 41.
83 Id. at 63, 304.
84 Id. at 41.
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fundamental principles, such as nulla poena sine lege, was essential in order
to ensure predictability or equality before the law.85 This may be an early
sign that the positive justice dimension 6 of nulla poena sine lege, which
has already been recognized in domestic law for its valuable contribution in
improving sentencing practice, is being considered in the international
context. In addition, not only were there consistent expressions of opinio
juris by the states on the importance of fundamental principles of criminal
law but also, significantly, the reasons articulated for faithful adherence to
them reflect those interests protected by the lex certa, lex scripta, lex stricta
and lex praevia requirements 87 of nulla poena sine lege. Accordingly, any
compromise on the quality of nulla poena sine lege as measured by these
four requirements would directly undermine the reasons widely expressed
and agreed upon by states for their opinion that punishment in international
criminal law must comply with nullapoena sine lege.
At least one author has been puzzled over the "preoccupation" with
nulla poena.88 Schabas infers that the positions of states, outlined above,
reflect a narrow "concern about the issue of retroactivity." 89 He concludes
that "such a concern ... is difficult to understand given that this question
was supposedly well settled at Nuremberg." 90 His argument is quite simple:
if post-World War II trials permitted the death penalty, can any defendant
seriously argue that he faces a heavier penalty than the one applicable at the
time the offense was committed? Indeed, if the concern is limited to the lex
praevia attribute of nulla poena, then, as Schabas astutely puts it, all the
fuss is "difficult to understand," assuming, of course, that life imprisonment
is not a more severe penalty than capital punishment. 9' Yet, it is reasonable
to infer that perhaps, in expressing their support for adhering to a national
penalties regime, the states were concerned with more than simply the
prohibition of retroactive penalties. States appear to have been also
concerned about legal certainty (lex certa) and consistency in sentencing,
concerns captured by a broader approach to nulla poena sine lege that gives
due appreciation for its function as a principle of positive justice. As noted
above, for example, the United States encouraged the adoption of
sentencing guidelines. The very nature of such a proposal strongly
indicates that the concern is not so much about abusive or retroactive
85 Id.
86 See supra Part II.B.
87 See supra Parts IIA-B.
88 Schabas, supra note 59.
89 Id. at 468-69.
90 Id. at 469.
91 The issue of whether life imprisonment is not a more severe penalty than capital
punishment is further discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 176-178.
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punishment, but more about the quality of justice in punishing individuals
brought before the court. Likewise, one could view adherence to national
penalties as a more organic means of achieving the stated goals of the ICTY
as reflected in the opinion of the Netherlands which encouraged following
the sentencing norms of the locus delicti. As Schabas acknowledges, when
adopting the ICTY statute, states were aware of the complexities
surrounding applicable penalties, such as the fact that Yugoslavian law
limited terms of imprisonment to twenty years, had no provisions for life
imprisonment or prison sentences of twenty-five, forty-five, or forty-six
years,92 but allowed for the death penalty which would not have passed a
veto of at least one member of the Security Council.93 Accordingly, it may
be too speculative to attribute to the states a narrow conception of nulla
poena, limited to the lex praevia principle, and on that basis, proceed to
diminish the relevance of nulla poena in international criminal justice.94
The drafters' concerns, extending beyond the mere issue of non-
retroactivity, become even plainer when the matter is considered from an
alternative perspective. If one removes the national law provision, on the
assumption that it is unnecessary because lex praevia is not in issue, we are
left with a provision that provides no better guidance to judges than the
penalty provision of the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Since the
death penalty is already excluded by operation of the first sentence, what
serious guidance can be gleaned from criteria of "gravity of the offense"
95
that cannot be read into the IMT criteria of "just punishment"? If, as
Schabas points out, the Hans Corell commission 96 was ill at ease with the
IMT sentencing precedent, then there is no reason to presume that it was
limited to the issue of non-retroactivity.
97
92 Such as those, respectively, visited upon Prosecutor v. Kordie, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,
Judgment (Feb. 26, 2001), aff'd, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment (Dec. 17, 2004),
Prosecutor v. Blafki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, Judgment (July 29, 2004) (reducing the
original sentence to nine years), and Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment
(Apr. 19, 2004) (reducing Krsti6's sentence to thirty-five years).
93 Schabas, supra note 59, at 479.
94 For a broader approach to nulla poena, see BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at
700; Allen, supra note 3; Robinson, supra note 2.
95 Or even the criteria of"concerning the individual circumstance of the accused."
96 In February 1993, while acting under the auspices of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, a team of experts lead by Hans Corell, along with Helmut Turk and
Gro Hillestad Thune, proposed to the United Nations the formation of an international
criminal tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of the mass atrocities unfolding in Yugoslavia.
97 Schabas, supra note 59, at 471. This misattribution of meaning concerning nulla
poena in this context perhaps reflects old differences traditionally between common law and
civil law lawyers. While certain common law systems, like that of the United States, now
follow a practice of strict articulation of penalties per crime, generally speaking it has not
been theoretically linked to nulla poena sine lege. Thus, the instinctive reaction to the
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In sum, based on the views expressed by states above, the following
observations can be made as to the quality of nulla poena sine lege in
international law. First, almost without exception, states share the view that
the principle of non-retroactivity (lex praevia) is a fundamental feature of
any criminal justice system, including international criminal law.98 Second,
lex scripta and lex certa are likewise recognized as essential requirements
of nulla poena sine lege.99 It was noted that "the principle of legality (nulla
poena sine lege) required that penalties be defined in the draft statute of the
Court as precisely as possible."'00 For example, some states expressed the
view that more precise maximum penalties should be included as part of the
definitions of specific crimes.10' This proposal mirrors state practice at the
domestic level where national criminal legislation typically contains a
specific maximum penalty following the definition of the crime. It was
further expressed that not only maximum penalties, but also "minimum
penalties for each crime should be carefully set out in the draft statute."'
10 2
Suggestions were also made to include even more detailed sentencing
regulations addressing, for example, "cumulative penalties for multiple
crimes, an exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances and a non-
exhaustive list of attenuating circumstances."
10 3
Thus, state practice and opinio juris on nulla poena sine lege suggest
that customary international law recognizes a nulla poena sine lege rule
which contains a significant lex certa, lex scripta, lex stricta and lex praevia
quality. Moreover, it is widely agreed that, in the context of criminal law
and in the imposition of penal sanctions, the applicable penalties should be
defined precisely, even if there is some disagreement in certain cases on
what the maximum penalty should be. In this sense, it can be reasonably
principle of legality among common law lawyers still focuses narrowly on its prohibition of
retroactive penalties. Civil law traditions, in which Mr. Corell once served as a criminal
judge, take a broader approach to nulla poena sine lege, accounting also for its "positive
justice" function and demonstrate a deeper tradition in doctrinally linking their practice to
nulla poena. In the many excellent commentaries that Schabas has written on international
sentencing, this broader conception of nulla poena sine lege is not contemplated. See also
Schabas, supra note 2; William A. Schabas, Penalties, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1497-1534 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John
Jones eds., 2002); William A. Schabas, Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle:
National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 11 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 521 (2000).
9 See ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report, supra note 27, at 43.
SId. at 41-43.joo Id. at 63, 304.
1o1 See id at 228 n.68 [hereinafter Compilation of Proposals]. For example, as to various
violations of the laws and customs of war, some suggested distinguishing specific maximum
penalties.
102 ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report, supra note 27, at 63, 304 (emphasis added).
103 Id.
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concluded that customary international law on nulla poena sine lege
contains stricter requirements regarding the application of penalties than is
reflected in treaty provisions of positive international law.
C. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW
A third source of international law to consider in order to distill the
international standard for nulla poena sine lege is general principles of
law. 10 4 "General principles of law" are principles guiding a legal system or
overarching legal norms which find widespread acceptance in national law
of states.10 5 Lord Phillimore, a key figure in the formulation of the concept,
explained that by "general principles of law" he meant "maxims of law."',
0 6
The primary function of "general principles of law"' in international
adjudication is "to make the law of nations a viable system for application
of judicial process."' 1 7 "General principles of law" are particularly relevant
when international tribunals must rule on substantive issues in matters not
readily susceptible to international state practice. Emerging or rapidly
growing areas of international law are prime examples, including
international criminal prosecutions, which provide an adjudicatory forum
for the direct application of criminal sanctions to individuals by
international institutions.' 08 Given that international justice, as a legal
system, may be considered to be at a rudimentary stage,1°9 "general
principles of law" allow international tribunals to draw upon elements of
better developed systems, resulting in the advancement of the international
legal system.' ° This is particularly true for international criminal justice.
As both a body of law and as an adjudicatory process, international criminal
law is replete with lacunae. A lacuna, however, should not be
misunderstood as a normative standard.
The majority of commentators consider Article 38's reference to
"general principle of law" to include general principles of national legal
104 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1999 I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c). See generally
BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 15-19; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED
BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1987); SHAW, supra note 63, at 92-99; Michael
Bogdan, General Principles of Law and the Problem of Lacunae in the Law of Nations, 46
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 37 (1977).
105 BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 16; SHAW, supra note 63, at 94; Bogdan, supra note 104,
at 42.
106 CHENG, supra note 104, at 24.
107 BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 16.
108 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (2nd ed. 2005).
109 Id.; SHAW, supra note 63, at 93.
110 BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 16.
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systems.' This approach is also generally followed in international
criminal justice and judgments of post-World War II tribunals. For
example, the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that
where a principle is "accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by
most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of International
Law would seem to be fully justified."'"12 Modem international criminal
tribunals also turn to municipal law when formulating a "general principle
of law" in order to fill lacunae. 3  While a principle must represent a
common theme in the different legal traditions, most commentators agree
that it is not necessary to demonstrate its presence in each and every
country in the world. 14 Nevertheless, the four attributes underlying the
principle of legality are well represented in the world's diverse legal
systems. 115
In a recent comprehensive survey of 192 national constitutions of
member states of the United Nations, Professor Kenneth Gallant
demonstrated that more than three quarters of the nations recognize nulla
poena, especially lex praevia, in their constitution, including Islamic,
Asian, civil law, and common law countries."' Several other countries
adhere to nulla poena pursuant to domestic statutes. 17 A 1993 survey of
139 national constitutions by Bassiouni revealed that 96 states contain an
expression of the principle of legality in their constitutions, in addition to
111 Id. (citing Root, Phillimore, Guggenheim, and Oppenheim); SHAW, supra note 63, at
93-94 ("[B]oth municipal legal concepts and those derived from existing international
practice can be defined as falling within the recognised catchment area."); Bogdan, supra
note 104, at 42. The ICTY also followed this approach in its first sentencing judgment.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 19 (Nov. 29, 1996).
For a discussion and further references on additional conceptions of "general principles of
law", for example one which contemplates "natural law", see CHENG, supra note 104, at 2-4.
For the drafting history of the provision, see id. at 6-26.
112 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others
(Case No. 47), in 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 49 (1949) [hereinafter
Hostages], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Law-Reports Vol-8.pdf.
113 Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and
Judge Vohrah, 57 ("[G]eneral principles of law are to be derived from existing legal
systems, in particular, national systems of law."); see also Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 25, 63, 65 (Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor
v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T, Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses K, L and M to
Give Their Testimony by Means of Video-Link Conference, 8 (May 28, 1997).
114 SHAW, supra note 63, at 94; Bogdan, supra note 104, at 46; see also Erdemovi6, Case
No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 25.
115 Bassiouni Study, supra note 69, at 290; see also supra text accompanying notes 20-
33, 69-76.
116 KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 243-46 (2009).
117 id.
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the good many others that adhere to the principle in case law or practice." 8
Moreover, rulings of national courts indicate that the nulla poena norm,
whether found in the constitution or in statute, is not limited to its lex
praevia function, the prohibition of retroactive application of a heavier
penalty. Challenging the presumption that only civil law countries adhere
to a full nulla poena principle, a state court in the United States overturned
a conviction for attempted murder because the offense as defined in the
criminal code was not accompanied by a penalty specific to that crime." 9
In doing so, the court upheld not only the lex certa principle, that the
penalty must be clearly defined, of nulla poena sine lege, but also its lex
stricta attribute, the prohibition against application of criminal penalties by
analogy. 20 Likewise, in light of nulla poena's widespread presence in
national legal systems, international courts have implicitly relied on
"general principles of law" in order to apply a nulla poena rule that extends
beyond its lex praevia function. 121 Accordingly, nulla poena sine lege may
be considered a "general principle of law" within the meaning of Article
38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1
22
D. INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT: OPINION OF THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
In 1935, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was
offered the opportunity to address the principle of legality in the Advisory
Opinion on the Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the
Constitution of the Free City.123 In August of 1935, the city of Danzig,
following the example of Nazi law, amended its criminal code to permit
punishment in the absence of a legal provision. The amendment decreed
that an act is punishable:
18 Bassiouni Study, supra note 69, at 291.
119 Cook v. Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] 'crime is
made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed penalty. The former without the
latter is no crime."').
120 Id. The court refused to turn to a similar crime or the method generally followed by
penalties for inchoate crimes for other crimes in order to provide a penalty.
121 See, e.g., Ba~kaya v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10,
36 (1999); Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the
Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65 (Dec. 4) [hereinafter Danzig
Decrees], available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1935.12.04_danzig/;
1 J.H.W. VERZ1JL, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORLD COURT: A CASE BY CASE
COMMENTARY (1965).
122 Bassiouni Study, supra note 69, at 291-93.
123 Danzig Decrees, supra note 121; see VERZIJL, supra note 121 (containing a
commentary).
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(1) where it is declared by law to be punishable, and
(2) where, according to the fundamental idea of a penal law and according to sound
popular feeling, it deserves punishment. Where there is no particular penal law
applicable to the act, it shall be punished in virtue of the law whose fundamental
conception applies most nearly.
124
Another decree accorded "[w]ider latitude ... to judges" and permitted
the "'[c]reation of law... by the application of penal analogy."",125 The
PCIJ noted that the "object of these new provisions is stated to be to enable
the judge to create law to fill up gaps in the penal legislation."'126 On the
other hand, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code in force in Danzig
before the amendment provided: "'An act is only punishable if the penalty
applicable to it was already prescribed by a law in force before the
commission of the act. ' ' ' 127 The court recognized that this provision gave
effect to the maxims nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.
The consequence, according to the PCIJ, was that the "law alone determines
and defines an offense" and that the "law alone decrees the penalty." In
relation to nulla poena sine lege in particular, the court further held that the
maxim carries with it the principle that "[a] penalty cannot be inflicted in a
given case if it is not decreed by the law in respect of that case" and a
"penalty decreed by the law for a particular case cannot be inflicted in
another case."'' 28  Thus, the PCIJ opinion recognized the lex stricta
principle, that is, the prohibition on the application of a penalty by analogy,
as part and parcel of nulla poena sine lege. Moreover, the PCIJ also ruled
that the imposition of a penalty must be in accordance with the principles of
lex scripta and lex certa, although the opinion cannot be read so far as to
limit satisfaction of lex scripta to statutory written law. The PCIJ went on
to condemn the 1935 penal provision as incompatible with the principles of
law in the Constitution.129 In doing so, the PCIJ affirmed several important
general principles of law and recognized an international nulla poena sine
lege norm with strong attributes of lex scripta, lex certa, and lex stricta.
130
124 See Danzig Decrees, supra note 12 1.
125 Id. at 11.
126 id.
127 Id. at 4.
"2' Id. at 10.
129 Id.
130 The court was mindful, nevertheless, that nulla poena was not the only principle
relevant for consideration. It acknowledged that
[t]he problem of the repression of crime may be approached from two different standpoints, that
of the individual and that of the community. From the former standpoint, the object is to protect
the individual against the State: this object finds its expression in the maxim Nulla poena sine
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Only lex praevia was not addressed and this appears to be because the
question of retroactive application of the decree did not arise. According to
the research performed thus far, the principle of nulla poena sine lege does
not appear to have been addressed by the International Court of Justice.'
3
'
E. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
FOR NULLA POENA
Before continuing on to the next section to examine nulla poena sine
lege in the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals, it
may be useful to provide here a brief summary of some preliminary
observations arising from the analysis of this section on nulla poena sine
lege in international law. Positive international law incorporates the lex
praevia principle of nulla poena as a fundamental human right from which
no derogation is permitted. In interpreting this principle under Article 7 of
the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights held that this provision
also embodies the lex stricta principle as a fundamental attribute of nulla
poena as an individual right. But this ruling comes as no surprise as leading
commentaries on human rights conventions have long taken the view that
nulla poena is not limited to merely prohibiting retroactivity. In fact, the
status of lex stricta under international law was previously cemented by the
PCIJ decision in the Danzig Decrees case, which explicitly rejected the
application of penalties by analogy. 132 Although it may be tempting to
argue that a few cases are not conclusive of the issue, the absence of
contentious cases addressing the lex stricta principle does not necessarily
undermine its position in international law. It may simply be the result of
restricted adherence to the principle by states in the context of their own
national legal systems, where the practice of articulating specific penalties
per crime obviates the need to resort to analogy in order to impose a
penalty. More significantly, as we shall see later, the solidification of lex
stricta as a principle of international law in relation to the application of
penalty was achieved in the Rome Statute.
In connection with lex scripta and lex certa, customary international
law can contribute to a fuller appreciation of the international character of
nulla poena sine lege. State practice, as evidenced in the national
lege. From the second standpoint, the object is to protect the community against the criminal,
the basic principle being the notion Nullum crimen sine poena.
Id. at 16.
The PCIJ observed, however, that the decrees were based on the second principle
where as the Constitution took the former principles as the starting point. See id at 16.
131 This is a tentative result for which the research is ongoing. To date, no ICJ cases
have been found addressing this issue.
132 See supra Part III.C.
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legislation of an overwhelming majority of states, coupled with state
expressions of opiniojuris, strongly indicate that the legal principles of lex
scripta and lex certa may be considered as part of an international nulla
poena sine lege norm. 133  Additionally, as discussed above, these four
underlying principles of nulla poena sine lege may be considered as
"general principles of law." Accordingly, the four legal principles
underlying nulla poena sine lege may be considered as part of its
international character.
IV. NULLA POENA IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS & TRIBUNALS
A. POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD: PRAGMATICS OVER PRINCIPLES
The question of legality was ardently contested in the proceedings
before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg. The debate
focused primarily on the question of "punishability" of the conduct. Nazi
defendants before the IMT argued that the charges against them for crimes
against the peace and crimes against humanity violated nullum crimen sine
lege. The IMT rejected this argument. It reasoned that the crimes under its
jurisdiction had been prohibited under international law since the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of
1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact). 134 The Hague Regulations and the Kellogg-
Briand Pact themselves, however, do not characterize their breach as
criminal, nor call for individual criminal responsibility, nor prescribe a
penalty. Nevertheless, these notable absentees did not appear to trouble the
IMT which observed that these international agreements "deal with general
principles of law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. ' 135 The
judgment discusses at length the nullum crimen question, but offers little or
no analysis of nullapoena.
Accordingly, while the Nuremberg precedent serves as an illustration
of treatment of the principle of legality by an international court, its utility
as an international source of law arising from a "judicial decision"' 136 maybe considered to be limited to the nullum crimen sine lege maxim.
133 This analysis also applies to lex praevia, because it is likewise a fundamental feature
in most domestic legal systems. Unlike the other three principles, it has, as noted above,
been codified into positive international law.
134 The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War is more generally known as the Pact
of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At the outbreak of World War II, it was binding on
sixty-three nations.
135 Judgment, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 221 (1947).
136 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1999 I.C.J. art. 38(l)(d).
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Therefore, caution must be exercised in drawing broad inferences from the
IMT judgment regarding the nature of the principle of legality generally
because the nulla poena debate is not well represented. Although some
references to nulla poena are made, it seems that for the large part this
maxim was overlooked by all parties involved.1 37 The oversight seems to
flow from collapsing two separate issues into one inquiry. Rather than
dealing with nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege
individually, the inquiry focused on whether the conduct proscribed in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal was reflected in general
prohibitions found in international treaties. From the Nuremberg records
and commentaries, it appears that it was widely presumed that if the
punishability of the conduct was determined to satisfy the principle of
legality then the penalties prescribed by the Charter were appropriate. The
Charter permitted the imposition of the death penalty. 38 There likewise
appears to be little consideration given to the fact that, even prior to World
War II, some European countries had already moved away from the notion
that the death penalty is an appropriate form of punishment.
139
137 Schabas, Penalties, supra note 97, at 1498.
138 Article 27 of the Charter authorized IMT to impose "death or such other punishment
as shall be determined by it to be just" upon a convicted war criminal. See Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 27,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS 55 (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 2d ed. 2000). This vague and
general clause was the Nuremburg Charter's only provision addressing the subject of
penalties. Article 27 was reproduced in Article 16 of the Tokyo Charter, Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589, and Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Nuremberg Trials Final Report app. D, art.
11(3) (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt O.asp.
139 Prior to the war years, a number of European countries had already abolished the
death penalty. For example, in the Netherlands, the last recorded execution occurred in
1860, and by 1870, the Netherlands abolished the death penalty for all crimes except military
offenses and war crimes. Likewise, Belgium, with one exception in 1918, had not executed
the death penalty since 1863. Thus, by the time of World War 1I, there existed over half a
century of abolitionist practice, vis-A-vis the execution of the death penalty, among these
countries of the future Benelux region, which had fallen victim to Nazi aggression. Of
course, the fact that war crimes had been exempted from these early abolitions of capital
punishment bodes in favor of the IMT's resort to it. Moreover, immediately following the
defeat of Nazi Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and a host of other European
countries responded with a wave of executions and enforcement of death penalties against
various members of the Nazi party who had surrendered or were captured in various
localities that had been under occupation. This rapid and widespread use of the death
penalty among European countries victimized by Nazi aggression, genocide, and war crimes
raises legitimate skepticism of France's uncompromising refusal of the Rwandan
government's proposal that the ICTR be empowered to have the option of imposing the
death penalty for those senior political and military figures who masterminded the 1994
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In the post-war period, the International Law Commission (ILC) also
briefly reflected on the issue of penalties by its consideration of the Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The 1951
proposal contained a terse article on penalties: "The penalty for any offence
defined in this Code shall be determined by the tribunals exercising
jurisdiction over the individual accused, taking into account the gravity of
the offence."' 140 Although the subsequent revised 1954 proposal removed
this article, the ILC's discussion of the issue suggests that this decision does
not signal a defeat of the nulla poena norm in international law. 41 In fact,
several members supported a penalty provision more precise than the above
article. 142 Several states also favored this approach as reflected in their
comments on the proposed text.143 In the end, the ILC shied away from
including a more specific penalty provision for a variety of reasons. For
example, there were concerns that the task of the Commission here was
limited to defining the crimes, and not to dictating the type of penalties.'
44
Several members expressly stated that penalties were not included because
it is left to the states to specify the penalty according to their domestic laws,
as protected by Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. However,
there was a strong consensus that states themselves were obliged to provide
the necessary penalties and the final report included a comment to that
effect.' 45 Thus, it is clear that the absence of a penalty provision was not a
reflection on the applicability of nulla poena sine lege to the punishment of
international crimes. It certainly was not intended to suggest that
international criminal justice enjoys carte blanche when it came to
penalties, as best captured by the comments of one expert, Mr. Carlos
Salamanca Figueroa, who at the time was a member of the International
Law Commission:
genocide in Rwanda. See Capital Punishment Worldwide Pages, http://www.geocities.com/
richard.clark32@btinternet.com/europe.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
140 Summary Records of the Third Session, [1951] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 81, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/44.
141 Summary Records of the Sixth Session, [1954] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 139, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/85/1954 [hereinafter ILC Records].
142 Id. The strongest view along these lines was expressed by Mr. G. Scelle who
considered the absence of a penalty provision as "tantamount to saying that the offences in
question would go unpunished." 1d. This reflects the view of some leading authorities on
substantive criminal law. E.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986) ("A crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct
and a prescribed penalty. The former without the latter is no crime.").
143 For example, Belgium proposed that a scale of penalties be laid down. See ILC
Records, supra note 141, at 139.
1 Id. at 124, 139.
4 Id. at 139.
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If the offenses in question were to be tried by a national court, that court would
necessarily have to apply penalties laid down in the particular State's criminal law. If
an international court were to be set up, it would be unwise to give it the very wide
power to determine the penalty to be applied to each crime. No doubt that problem
would be dealt with when such a court came to be set up.
146
B. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE IN THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS: THE
PHANTOM MAXIM
When the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and
Yugoslavia were called upon to interpret and apply their sentencing
provisions, the IMT judgments and norms arising from other sources of
international law 147 presented divergent approaches to the task of sentencing
in accordance with nulla poena sine lege. The tribunals were technically
not bound by either and yet each could be argued in support of a particular
approach. In light of the comments of the United Nations Secretary-
General and the representatives of other countries,t 48 a firm approach to
nulla poena sine lege would have probably raised little objection.
Regarding the determination of a penalty, the statutes of the ad hoc
tribunals contained a reference back to national practice. Article 24 of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) statute
and Article 23 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
statute provides: "The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be
limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the
Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of [the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda].' 49
Although several commentators observed that the national law
provision was included out of concern for respecting nulla poena sine
lege,150 two characteristics of the construction of this article open a window
to debate the binding force of the national law provision on the discretion of
judges when determining a sentence. The first provision of this article
provides a clear limitation on the authority of judges regarding the form of
punishment that may be imposed. Penalties "shall be limited" to
146 id.
147 See discussion supra Parts III.A-D,
148 See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy, supra note 78; see also
Summary Records of the 17th Meeting, supra note 74.
149 ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(1); Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 23(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute]. The second sentence of this paragraph will hereinafter be referred to as the
"national law provision."
15o See, e.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 692, 700; MoRRIS & SCHARF,
supra note 75, at 94; Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra note 97, at 524-28.
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imprisonment. 5 ' Thus, by implication, the ICTY and ICTR are not
authorized to impose the death penalty. In contrast, the second provision is
drafted rather awkwardly. Like the first provision, it employs the directive
"shall," instead of "may," suggesting that the judges do not have discretion
to ignore the directive contained within this provision. Unfortunately, it
follows this imperative ("shall") with a less then forceful instruction ("have
recourse to"). The force of the national law provision as a binding
instruction on the judges is further compromised by the fact that it follows a
provision that unambiguously sets a clear limit. The inevitable comparison
between the two provisions ("shall be limited to" versus "shall have
recourse to") further opens the window to argue that it is not a binding
limitation on the sentencing discretion of judges.
The ICTY's first opportunity to interpret the national law provision of
Article 24 came unexpectedly when it was suddenly plunged into
sentencing considerations as a result of Dra~en ErdemoviS's decision to
plead guilty. 15 2 Given that sentencing matters arise, if at all, at the end
stages of the criminal justice process, it was unforeseen that one of the
ICTY's earliest decisions would call upon the judges to interpret its
sentencing provisions. Academics, legal officers, and judicial law clerks
had been focusing on questions of jurisdiction, applicability of treaties
regulating international armed conflicts, and substantive elements of
crimes. Little analysis had been done on the articles of the ICTY statute
and rules of procedure and evidence pertaining to sentencing. 13
While the Erdemovi case provided the ICTY with its first opportunity
to render an interpretation of Article 24 in a sentencing judgment, it seems
that the question of the applicability of the national law provision as a
limitation on its sentencing authority had already been predetermined by the
judges. 54 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), promulgated and
adopted by the judges themselves prior to the Erdemovi,6 sentencing
judgment, seem to have already determined the issue. Rule 101 of the RPE,
as initially adopted on February 11, 1994, provides that "[a] convicted
person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the
151 ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(1).
152 Croat Pleads Guilty to War Crimes in Bosnia, CNN.coM, May 31, 1996, available at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/9605/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009);
see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment (Nov. 29,
1996).
153 See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis (1995)
(providing an early commentary on the Statute of the ICTY).
154 Schabas, supra note 59, at 480.
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remainder of his life.' 55  As the penal code of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (the former Yugoslavia) in force at the time of the
commission of the offences did not permit the imposition of a life sentence,
Rule 101 foreshadowed the attitude of the judges towards the national law
provision.
The Erdemovie case involved a low level soldier in the Bosnian Serb
Army who participated in the killing of groups of Muslim civilians, namely
men between the ages of seventeen and sixty from Srebrenica, collected at a
farm site near Pilica, northwest of Zvomik. 156 By his own admissions,
Erdemovi6 murdered approximately seventy individuals. 157 He admitted his
involvement in these crimes, but insisted that he was forced to do so under
threat of death to himself and his family. 5 8 Thus, before the Trial Chamber
could proceed to a determination of the sentence, it had to deal with a more
fundamental issue-the validity of his guilty plea.15 9 Having satisfied itself
that the plea was valid, 60 notwithstanding Erdemovi's claim that he acted
under duress, the Trial Chamber proceeded to analyze the applicable law
and principles under the ICTY Statute which are relevant to the
determination of a sentence.
Regarding national laws and sentencing practice, Articles 141 to 156
of Chapter XVI of the criminal code of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia dealt with, inter alia, genocide and war crimes committed
against the civilian population. The penalty provided under Yugoslav law
was a minimum of five years and a maximum of fifteen years or a death
sentence.16 1 Pursuant to these same provisions, a twenty-year prison term
could be imposed instead of the death penalty. The Trial Chamber reasoned
that full consideration of the national law provision in the ICTY Statute also
requires taking into account the case law of the courts of the former
155 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, R. 101(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.32 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter ICTY RPE],
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS supra note 8, at 63, 68.
156 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 2 (Nov.
29, 1996).
157 Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, 15 (Mar.
5, 1998). The Prosecution placed the number closer to one hundred individuals.
8 Erdemovi& had a wife and an infant child. Id. 14.
159 Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 10-21.
160 This ruling was overruled by the Appeals Chamber. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6,
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997) (holding that, in order to be valid, a plea of
guilty must be voluntary, informed, and unequivocal).
161 CRIM. CODE SOCIALIST FED. REP. YUGOSLAVIA, ch. 16, arts. 141-156 (1976)
[hereinafter FORMER YUGOSLAVIA CRIM. CODE], available at http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/training/justice/docs/CriminalCode of SFRY_1976.pdf.
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Yugoslavia. In this regard, there have been two significant trials for
genocide in Yugoslavia. The first took place in 1946 following World War
II against Mikhailovic and others. 162  The majority of defendants were
sentenced to death and executed. 63 The second trial took place forty years
later in which Artukovi6 was also sentenced to death, but died in prison of
natural causes.' 6" Thus, the practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia
on these "analogous" crimes was limited and the Trial Chamber concluded
that it "cannot draw significant conclusions as to the sentencing practices
for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia.' '165  However,
recognizing a principle of statutory interpretation, the Trial Chamber
acknowledged that it must interpret the national law provision in a manner
that gives it practical and logical effect. 166 Beginning with what appears to
be an implicit acknowledgement of the view of commentators, the Trial
Chamber reasoned:
It might be argued that the reference to the general practice regarding prison sentences
is required by the principle nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. Justifying the
reference to this practice by that principle, however, would mean not recognising the
criminal nature universally attached to crimes against humanity or, at best, would
render such a reference superfluous. The Trial Chamber has, in fact, demonstrated
that crimes against humanity are a well established part of the international legal order
and have incurred the severest penalties. It would therefore be a mistake to interpret
this reference by the principle of legality codified inter alia in paragraph 1 of Article
15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, according to which "no
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omissions
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed (...)." Moreover, paragraph 2 of that same article states
that "nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.167
The Trial Chamber's analysis here appears to be misplaced. It
improperly framed the issue as an inquiry into the "punishability" of the
conduct rather than the determination of the penalty itself. The error in
reasoning stems from its argument that interpreting and applying the
national law provision in light of the nulla poena principle would result in
"not recognizing the criminal nature" of the crimes committed by the
162 See Dylan Cors & Siobhdn K. Fisher, National Law in International Criminal
Punishment: Yugoslavia 's Maximum Prison Sentences and the United Nations War Crimes
Tribunal, 3 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 637 (1996).
163 Id.
164 id.
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accused. This is simply incorrect. Applying the national law provision in
accordance with nulla poena sine lege does not mean, as the Trial Chamber
suggested, that the defendant goes unpunished. It simply means that the
sentence would have to be in accordance with Yugoslavia's penalty
provisions. The Trial Chamber's misframing of the issue is further
demonstrated by its discussion of the principle of legality under Article 15
of the ICCPR. Although it is dealing with the question of applicable
penalties under Article 24 of its Statute and Yugoslavia's laws and
sentencing practice, the Trial Chamber turns to an analysis of the nullum
crimen sine lege provision in Article 15 of the ICCPR. The illogical effect
is that the Trial Chamber seems to attempt to reject a nulla poena argument
on the grounds that nullum crimen has been satisfied.
Whether by stratagem or unwittingly, the Trial Chamber collapsed the
analysis of the two principles nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen sine
lege. It conflated the two maxims and referred to the "requirements" of
"nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege," and then concluded that adherence
to this conflated principle would prevent recognition of the accused's acts
as criminal. Moreover, its preoccupation with Erdemovi's acts going
unpunished as the consequence of the nullum crimen principle, which is
essentially a punishability issue, was extraneous to its inquiry on the
appropriate sentence since, by this stage in the proceedings, the guilt of the
accused, and thus the legality of punishing the act, had already been
determined. Indeed, it appears that the accused did not even raise the
nullum crimen question, rendering the Trial Chamber's focus on it even
more out of place. 16 Furthermore, at his initial appearance before the Trial
Chamber, Erdemovi6 pled guilty to crimes against humanity as charged in
count one of the indictment.' 69  The Trial Chamber noted that crimes
against humanity, as defined in Article 5, are not "strictly speaking"
provided for in the criminal code of the former Yugoslavia.170 The Code
did however cover genocide and war crimes against civilians.' 7 '
Analogizing that the former Code penalized crimes "which are of a similar
nature to crimes against humanity,"' 172 the Erdemovi6 Trial Chamber
satisfied itself with regards to nullum crimen sine lege. This further
168 That is not to say that the nullum crimen question is entirely irrelevant to the matter
before the Chamber.
169 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22, Indictment (May 22, 1996);
Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 3. The plea was subsequently
changed to a guilty plea to count 2 of Indictment for violations of the laws or customs of
war.
170 Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 35.
171 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA CRIM. CODE, supra note 161.
172 Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 35.
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highlights the oddity of the Trial Chamber's return to the nullum crimen
principle when interpreting the national law provision of Article 24.
The legal stratagem used by the Erdemovie Trial Chamber to free itself
from any potential limitation arising from Article 24(1) is not immediately
apparent. As noted above, the use of analogy in application of penalties is
not unprecedented. 173 However, the use of analogy generally follows the
approach of analogizing between similar crimes in order to identify an
appropriate penalty. But the Erdemovie Trial Chamber went beyond
analogizing between similar crimes to analogizing between different legal
systems. It employed analogy at two levels. First, it drew an analogy
between genocide and war crimes committed against civilian populations
under the former Yugoslavia's criminal code on the one hand, and offenses
under Article 5 (crimes against humanity) of its Statute, on the other hand.
Having identified the "analogous" crimes, however, the Trial Chamber did
not content itself with the penalties provided by law establishing the
relevant "analogous" crimes. Instead, it continued with a second level of
comparison between the penalty attached to the identified "analogous"
crimes under the laws of the legal system of the locus delicti to the penalty
attached under a different legal system, that of the locusfori. This method
of expansive interpretation is beyond the permissible scope even in
countries that allow resort to analogy in determining penalties. 74 The Trial
Chamber justified this methodology by relying on a principle it identified:
that the Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia "reserves its most severe
penalties for crimes, including genocide, which are of a similar nature to
crimes against humanity."1 75 The observation is correct, but it does not
explain why the Trial Chamber did not limit itself to the penalties provided
by the Code. Rather than selecting a severe Yugoslav penalty, which marks
the logical conclusion of its reasoning, the Trial Chamber chose to select
the most severe international law penalty. This latter step is not covered by
its justification. It would be a different matter if the ICTY Statute
authorized such a maneuver-that is, substituting international law's most
severe penalty in place of Yugoslavia's. But it does not, and in fact the
Statute does just the opposite: it instructs trial chambers to turn to
Yugoslavia's sentencing laws and practice.
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber's analysis assumes in the first place
that it is correct on a fundamentally important assumption, namely that life
imprisonment is not a more severe penalty than capital punishment. The
assumption here cannot be said to have gained sufficient universal
173 See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 124.
174 id.
175 Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 35 (emphasis added).
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acceptance so as to justify its blanket endorsement by an international
institution. Many states, Yugoslavia included, hold the view that life
imprisonment is crueler and more severe than capital punishment.17 6 The
former Yugoslavia, while permitting capital punishment, had abolished the
penalty of life imprisonment. 7 7 It is entirely reasonable, depending on a
society's presumptions about the metaphysical and the purpose of
incarceration, to permit capital punishment but abolish life imprisonment.
The error in reasoning and methodology here stems from the Trial
Chamber's reliance on a subjective assessment as to what constitutes a
"heavier penalty." So long as the comparison is between penalties of the
same type, the determination of whether the imposed penalty is heavier than
the one applicable at the time the offense occurred is straight-forward and
objective.178 However, where the comparison is between different types of
penalties, the assessment becomes more subjective and less objective.
Consequently, it is more difficult to objectively conclude that the
prohibition against the imposition of a "heavier penalty" has not been
breached.
As noted above, a latent tension exists between the IMT legacy and the
principles arising from human rights treaties when it comes to sentencing in
accordance with nulla poena sine lege. In this regard, the Erdemovi6 Trial
Chamber's reliance on the treatment of nulla poena by IMT and other
judgments in the immediate wake of World War 11179 can be criticized for
failing to take sufficient account of the development of international human
rights law on this point since World War 11.180 Since then, as illustrated
above, major international human rights treaties, widely supported by
states, have recognized the principle of nulla poena sine lege as a norm of
international law and a fundamental right of an accused. 18  There has also
been a corresponding development of criminal law principles in domestic
law systems. 
82
176 See Stuart Beresford, Unshackling the Paper Tiger-The Sentencing Practice of the
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT'L
CRIM. L. REv. 33, 48 (2001); Schabas, supra note 59, at 479-80.
177 See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi6, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255 (2001).
178 NOWAK, supra note 34, at 364.
179 ErdemoviW, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 29, 38.
180 See Mary Margaret Penrose, Comment, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement
in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 372 (2000).
181 See also Schabas, supra note 59, at 464.
182 For example, as noted above, the movement towards codification of criminal law in
the 1950s in the United States that lead to the drafting of the Model Penal Code. Today, all
states of the union have codes setting forth both the definitions of the crimes and the
applicable penalties. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
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Yet, the Erdemovi6 Trial Chamber overlooks these developments and
turns instead to a single decision from 1949 of a Netherlands special court
for guidance on what nulla poena requires fifty years later.'8 3 In addition to
failing to appreciate the normative development of nulla poena over the
past five decades, the Erdemovi Trial Chamber's reliance on the Dutch
case is misplaced for yet another reason. The argument of the accused
before the Dutch special court was that he could not be punished at all
because of a lack of legal sanctions previously prescribed by law. 184 The
laws of the former Yugoslavia, however, did provide for legal sanctions
previously prescribed; 85 thus, the ICTY in Erdemovi6 was facing a
different issue than the Dutch court. The issue before the ICTY was not
that Erdemovi6 could not be punished, but rather what that punishment
should be, and more generally how should the ICTY go about determining
the period of incarceration and the relevance of national sentencing laws.
Again, we see that the error stems from the Trial Chamber's failure to
distinguish between nullum crimen and nulla poena 8 6 It is puzzling (even
disingenuous to the cynical eye) that the Trial Chamber chose to collapse its
own analysis on this issue into an inquiry about nullum crimen nulla poena
sine lege especially given that it observed that the Dutch special court was
addressing nulla poena. 18
7
Taking the position that the national law provision in its statute was
not binding upon the ICTY, the Trial Chamber attempted to bolster its view
by emphasizing a single isolated comment contained in a UN report
attached to a proposed draft of the ICTY statute. 88 The Trial Chamber
drew specific attention to the permissive tone of the Secretary-General's
comments: "[I]n determining the term of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers
should have recourse to the general practice of prison sentences applicable
183 In re Rauter, Spec. Crim. Ct., The Hague (May 4, 1948), reprinted in H.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 13, at 526, 542-43 (1949).
184 Id.
185 Erdemovi6 ultimately ended up pleading guilty to war crimes. Prosecutor v.
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 8 (Nov. 29, 1996).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 165-167.
187 Erdemovi , Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 38 (observing that the
Dutch Special Court was "seized of a line of defence based on the principle nulla poena sine
lege").
188 Pursuant to the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations prepared a background report that accompanied the proposed draft statute of the
ICTY. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter
Secretary-General's Report].
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in the courts of the former Yugoslavia."' 18 9 It then isolated this phrase and
relied on it to achieve the not-so-subtle ends sought, namely freeing the
Tribunal of any limitation on sentencing arising from the general practice of
the former Yugoslavia.
There are at least two problems with the Trial Chamber's reasoning
and methodology here. First, the Trial Chamber fails to appreciate the
context of the Secretary-General's report and the relationship between the
Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Trial Chamber
characterizes the Secretary-General's comment as an "interpretation" of the
Statute. The comment, however, is not intended as an "interpretation" of
the Statute, but rather as a rationalization for the inclusion or exclusion of
matters from the scope of the Statute. 190 These comments are made as an
introduction to the proposed text of the Statute that follows them. The
permissive tone is intended to defer to the authority of the Security Council
to ultimately decide upon the final text of the Statute. It recognizes that the
decision of whether to use "shall" or "should" is a policy choice to be made
by the Security Council in its role as the legislative body of the ICTY
Statute. In the end, the Security Council chose "shall." For the judges to
go back and engage in a debate on whether the national law provision is
binding or permissive is to go beyond their function and legislate from the
bench, effectively redrafting their own statute.
It is submitted that this is the proper contextual understanding of the
permissive tone of the Secretary-General's comment, and not what the Trial
Chamber suggested, namely the modification of the actual text of the
Statute from "shall have" to "should have." Moreover, if the Secretary-
General in fact intended "should have," as the Trial Chamber suggested,
then he presumably would have maintained that language in the actual text
of the Statute that he proposes immediately following these comments.
Surely, if the Secretary-General intended "should," and not "shall," then his
proposed text would not have stated "shall."
The erroneous reasoning of the Trial Chamber is accentuated if we
attempt to apply its methodology and reasoning to the very next comment
that appears in the report of the Secretary-General: "The International
Tribunal should not be empowered to impose the death penalty."'91 The
proposed text of the Statute corresponding to this comment reads: "The
189 ErdemoviW, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 39 (quoting the Secretary-
General's Report, supra note 188, 111).
190 Much the same way that acts of national legislative bodies, which pass new laws, may
include rationalization for the new legislation. In this sense, they may form part of the
legislative history of the Statute.
191 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 188, 112.
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penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment."', 92
Applying the Trial Chamber's interpretative methodology would lead to the
conclusion that this provision is likewise not binding on trial chambers, and
consequently the ICTY could also apply the death penalty. Clearly, this is
not intended by the Secretary-General's use of the permissive language
("should") in his report, and the Trial Chamber may be criticized for
applying it in such a manner.
Second, the Trial Chamber may be reasonably criticized for not taking
full account of statements by Italy, Russia, the Netherlands, and other states
on this issue.' 93 Given that the Security Council approved the report of the
Secretary-General in Resolution 827 establishing the ICTY, the contents of
the report may be considered as part of the "legislative history" of the ICTY
Statute. However, it is only one among several possible sources that may
be considered as part of the "legislative history" of the Statute, including
comments from members of the Security Council at that time. The Trial
Chamber's presumption of exclusivity, or at the very least of priority,
towards the comments of the Secretary-General is questionable in this
regard. Moreover, even if the statements of the Secretary-General are to be
given greater weight than the views of a state, the use of legislative history
in the interpretation of a statute has limitations, and cannot have the effect
of contravening the plain and ordinary meaning of the text.
In the end, the Erdemovi6 Trial Chamber concluded that the laws and
practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia can be turned to for
guidance, but they are not binding on the trial chambers:
Whenever possible, the International Tribunal will review the relevant legal practices
of the former Yugoslavia but will not be bound in any way by those practices in the
penalties it establishes and the sentences it imposes for the crimes falling within its
jurisdiction. 194
192 Id. 115.
193 See supra Part III.B.
194 See Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 40. This position,
taken from the outset in the ICTY's seminal sentencing judgment, has been confirmed and
followed without deviation, entrenching it deep in the Tribunal's jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 349 (June 12,
2002); Prosecutor v. Kupreiki6, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 418 (Oct. 23,
2001); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing
Appeals, 21 (Jan. 26, 2000). This seminal sentencing judgment at the rebirth of
international criminal law also set the tone for other international tribunals, such as the ICTR
and East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes, which followed the ICTY position. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 1038 (Nov. 28, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Leite, Case No. 04b/2001, Judgment, 68 (Dec. 7, 2002); Prosecutor v.
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, Sentencing Order, 3 (May
21, 1999).
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Despite the Erdemovi6 Trial Chamber's declaration that it would not be
bound by Yugoslavia's sentencing practice, the penalty it imposed on
Erdemovi6 was in fact within the penalties provided for under Yugoslavia's
law. The Erdemovi6 holding, that the national law provision in Article
24(1) is not binding on the ICTY, has been reiterated by other trial
chambers 195 and consistently affirmed by the Appeals Chamber. 96  The
holding is now a well-established principle in the sentencing jurisprudence
of the ICTY, the ICTR, and other international criminal tribunals.197 This
"guidance but not binding" approach has proved illusory and, in practice,
has amounted to little more than a perfunctory reference to Yugoslavia's
sentencing laws.' 98 While earlier commentators on the ICTY Statute
conceded that the ambiguous language of the provision permitted such an
interpretation, they seemed ill at ease with the ICTY exercising unlimited
discretion in sentencing. Bassiouni, for example, argued that "the Tribunal
should follow the law of the former Yugoslavia" when determining
penalties.199 And while Morris and Scharf take the position that the ICTY
is not bound by the sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia, they seem
to do so with the assumption that the ICTY will "establish its own uniform
sentencing guidelines." 200 Moreover, in hindsight, it was perhaps naive to
believe, as some scholars suggested, that a flexible "directive but not
binding" approach would help "to achieve consistency in sentencing.,
20
'
The Erdemovi6 judgment does not provide much analysis of the nulla
poena maxim itself. Thus, it provides little guidance on the content and
character of the norm in international criminal proceedings. Efforts to
address the relevance of nulla poena sine lege in international criminal
justice came later in the Tadi case,202 and then only briefly in the separate
195 E.g., Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals,
21.
196 Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, TT 749-50 (Mar. 17, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovi5 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgment, 335 (Apr. 22,
2008); Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 349; Kupreikic, Case
No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, 418.
197 See supra note 194.
198 Hadlihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgment, 335; Schabas, supra
note 59.
199 BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 700.
200 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 75, at 276.
201 Schabas, supra note 59, at 481. Consistency in international sentencing remains
elusive whether concerned from a perspective internally to each Tribunal or externally
comparing the two ad hoc Tribunals.
202 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-l-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing
Appeals (Jan. 26, 2000).
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opinion of Judge Antonio Cassese.203 Still, to date, no judgment or decision
of the ICTY has elucidated the international standard for nulla poena sine
lege. According to Judge Cassese,
This principle is clearly intended to achieve three main objectives:
(i) to spell out the varying degree of disapproval or condemnation of certain instances
of misbehaviour by the social order. Clearly, the more reprehensible a course of
conduct is considered, the heavier the penalty imposed on persons engaging in that
conduct. Thus, if a national legal system provides for a penalty of 25 years'
imprisonment for murder whereas it envisages 10 years for theft, this signifies that
this legal system attaches greater importance to human life than to private property.
(ii) to ensure legal certainty by reducing the discretionary power of courts (arbitrium
judicis).
(iii) to brin about some relative uniformity and harmonisation in the application of
penalties.
2 0
It is worth noting that the main objectives of nulla poena sine lege, as
identified by Judge Cassese, relate to the positive justice function of nulla
poena sine lege.205 Here, Cassese reinforces the observation made earlier
that nulla poena sine lege is considered more than just a negative rights
principle. While acknowledging that nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali
is upheld in most national legal systems, Cassese inexplicably concluded
that it "is still inapplicable in international criminal law., 20 6 Although he
elaborated earlier on the objectives of nulla poena, this latter conclusion is
not as well developed. The objectives he identified, a teleological
understanding, as well as nulla poena's acknowledged adherence in
national practice strongly suggest an alternative conclusion. Accordingly,
his opinion would have benefited from further reasoning. In the absence of
such argumentation, 0 7 it may be assumed that this conclusion was drawn
from the fact that international conventions on criminal matters do not
contain specific penalties.208 However, as already noted, this cannot be read
to mean that nulla poena is inapplicable to international criminal justice. °9
203 Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals,
Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese.
204 Id 4.
205 Supra Part II.A.
206 Tadi, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, Separate
Opinion of Judge Cassese, 4.
207 Note that this conclusion appears in a separate opinion and thus does not represent the
views of the court.
208 See supra note 73. The same can be generally said about the statutes of international
criminal courts, which contain only broad guidelines on penalties.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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As Bassiouni argues, the absence of penalties provisions in these
conventions should be understood in light of the fact that international
criminal law regimes were generally indirect enforcement systems,
requiring states to prosecute the relevant crime domestically, and if need be,
enact appropriate legislation which provided the applicable penalty.1 °
Since the international community did not directly enforce the crimes
within these treaties, there was no need to lay out specific penalties in the
international instrument. Thus, Cassese correctly observes the absence of
specific penalty provisions in treaties that rely on indirect enforcement
through national law, but this does not per se nullify the force of nulla
poena sine lege in cases of direct enforcement by the international
community, a distinction made clear by the International Law
Commission.211  A lacuna does not establish an alternative international
standard for nulla poena, nor make the principle inapplicable to
international prosecutions. As Cassese's own treatise on international law
states, the very function of "general principles of law" as derived from
municipal systems is to fill such a lacuna.2 12 In addition, it should also be
noted that Cassese's views on nulla poena appear in a separate opinion
which disagrees with the majority's ruling that there is no hierarchy
between war crimes and crimes against humanity. His sweeping
conclusions about the applicability of nulla poena are not central to his
main argument and are provided only as "preliminary considerations."
In the early practice of the ICTY, it could be argued that despite their
strong rhetoric that they were not bound by the penalty scheme of the
former Yugoslavia, trial chambers, with a few exceptions, generally
sentenced within the range of penalties acceptable under Yugoslavia law. 1 3
The exceptions were limited to cases of notoriously sadistic perpetrators,21 4
high-ranking officers,21 5 and persons convicted of genocide.21 6 Indeed, in
order to persuade the Appeals Chamber to reduce his sentence, at least one
accused, while acknowledging that the ICTY jurisprudence holds that it is
210 BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 125-26; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 689.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 140-146.
212 CASSESE, supra note 108, at 193.
213 Beresford, supra note 176.
214 E.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisi&, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999)
(sentencing Jelisi6 to forty years imprisonment), aff'd, Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-
10-A, Judgment (July 5, 2001).
215 For example, the Trial Chamber sentenced General Blagki6 to forty-five years
imprisonment, which was reduced to nine years on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case
No. IT-95-14-T-A, Judgment (July 29, 2004).
216 E.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001) (sentencing
Krsti6 to forty-six years of imprisonment), modified, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-
33-A, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004) (reducing Krstic's sentence to thirty-five years on appeal).
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not bound by the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia, argued that
the practice of the ICTY up to that point had been to stay within the
sentencing range provided by Article 38 of the former Yugoslavia's
criminal code.217 In that case, the Trial Chamber predictably rejected the
defendant's argument that imposing a term of imprisonment of more than
fifteen years would violate the principle of legality.21 8 As a matter of
practice before the ICTY, defense counsel would profit from noting that the
Appeals Chamber's ostensible position is that comparing one accused to
another for the purposes of determining a penalty "is often of limited
assistance" and that "often the differences are more significant than the
similarities.,
219
In the past few years, the number of accused sentenced to more than
twenty years in prison has increased. However, an interesting development
took place in the Kunarac case.220 The Appeals Chamber ruled that family
circumstances constitute a mitigating factor and held that the Kunarac Trial
Chamber should have considered evidence of such circumstances as a
mitigating factor. 21 It is worth taking note that the Appeals Chamber made
this ruling relying on the "existing case-law of the Tribunal" and by




The Appeals Chamber further noted that:
Family concerns should in principle be a mitigating factor. Article 41(1) of the 1977
Penal Code required the courts of the former Yugoslavia to consider circumstances
including the "personal situation" of the convicted person. The Appeals Chamber
holds that this should have been considered as a mitigating factor.
223
Perhaps the Appeals Chamber's specific reference to and reliance on the
practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia should serve as a signal to
217 Prosecutor v. Delali6 ("Celebii Case"), Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, 811 (Feb.
20, 2001). The defendant urged the Trial Chamber to reduce his sentence on the grounds
that Trial Chambers had "scrupulously avoided assessing penalties greater than that imposed
under SFRY law." This ground of appeal predictably failed not only because of the standing
jurisprudence that ICTY is not bound by national sentencing practice but also because his
sentence of twenty years was within the sentencing range for serious crimes under Yugoslav
law. Although the general range for sentences of imprisonment was between five and fifteen
years, Yugoslav law allowed an increase to twenty years for "criminal acts... which were
perpetrated under particularly aggravating circumstances or caused especially grave
consequences." Id.
218 Id. 814. For the relevant passage of the trial judgment, see Prosecutor v. Delali6,
Case No. IT-96-2 1 -T, Judgment, 402 (Nov. 16, 1998).
219 eelebii Case, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, at 719.
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the trial chambers to give greater weight and consideration to the provisions
of national law and the practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia
when it comes to mitigating factors. Given the established principle in the
jurisprudence of the ICTY that national practice is not binding, this is the
most the Appeals Chamber could do to strengthen the role of sentencing
provisions in laws of Yugoslavia in the determination of a sentence by
ICTY trial chambers without overruling a well-entrenched principle and
throwing the integrity of its past sentences into jeopardy.
In the Celebii trial judgment, the legality of the penalty was
aberrantly analyzed under the nullum crimen sine lege principle rather than
nulla poena sine lege.224 It is unclear whether this mishap spawned from
the defendant's brief and was simply responded to in like by the Trial
Chamber 225 (in which case it would have been preferable for the Trial
Chamber to make note of the error) or whether the Celebii Trial Chamber,
like the Erdemovi6 Trial Chamber, is itself the cause of the failure to
adequately distinguish between the two maxims.
226
The Celebi6i Trial Chamber acknowledged the existence of some
"controversy" regarding its sentencing policy of substituting the Yugoslavia
maximum penalty (capital punishment) with the ICTY's maximum of life
imprisonment, in light of the fact that the former Yugoslavia had abolished
the latter sanction, which it viewed as cruel and inhuman.227 It defended
this policy by summarily concluding that it is "consistent with the practice
of States which have abolished the death penalty" 228 and by reference to the
views of one member of the Security Council.229 Even if it is acceptable
that life imprisonment is a suitable substitute for the death penalty, a
proposition which has not gone unchallenged,23 ° the Trial Chamber's
analysis is incomplete in another important aspect. Under Yugoslav law, an
accused could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years
or sentenced to capital punishment, which could be mitigated to a sentence
of twenty years. However, a term of imprisonment beyond twenty years
224 Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1209-12 (Nov. 16, 1998).
225 Id. 1197. However, on appeal the Appeals Chamber referred to the defendant's
submissions as challenging the sentence on the grounds that "the Trial Chamber erred in
violating the principle of nulla poena sine lege." Celebii Case, Case No. IT-96-23-A,
Judgment, 809.
226 DelaliW, Case No. IT-96-2 1-T, Judgment, 1210.
227 Id 1208.
228 Id. Although this is an assumption that is commonly repeated, it is unfortunate that
the Trial Chamber does not provide a single example, much less illustrate a "consistent"
practice, to bolster its reasoning.
229 Id.
230 Objections arise from both a legal and normative perspective. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI &
MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 702.
SHAHRAMDANA
was not permissible. It was either twenty years or the death penalty. Thus,
even if the ICTY policy of substituting the death penalty with life
imprisonment is correct, this does not automatically justify terms of
imprisonment that exceed twenty years. A sentencing policy that would be
faithful to the Statute's directive of having "recourse to the sentencing
practice of the former Yugoslavia" would be one that set a maximum term
of imprisonment at twenty years while permitting life imprisonment.2
By explicit reference, however, the Trial Chamber rejected the position
of Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni who concluded that imprisonment in
excess of twenty years allowed under "the applicable national codes" would
violate the principle of legality, 232 characterizing his opinion as "an
erroneous and overly restrictive view of the concept., 233 The Celebii Trial
Chamber held that "the governing consideration for the operation of the
nullum crimen sine lege principle is the existence of a punishment with
respect to the offence.... The fact that the new punishment of the offence
is greater than the former punishment does not offend the principle." 234 In
other words, according to the Trial Chamber, once a penalty-any
penalty-is provided for, then the accused are put on notice generally that
their conduct can subject them to criminal jurisdiction, and thus the
principle of legality is not violated, even if the court now substitutes its own
higher penalty for the original penalty.235 Once again, international judges
misconstrue the principle of legality as encompassing only the nullum
crimen principle, and fail to consider nulla poena separately. While the
existence of a law making certain conduct a punishable offense satisfies
nullum crimen, the substitution and enforcement of a higher penalty after
the commission of the conduct violates nulla poena. The Celebii Trial
Chamber's application of the principle of legality here grants the benefits of
legality on the innocent but withholds it from the guilty.
231 Similar in structure to the sentencing provisions that were finally adopted in ICC
Statute, supra note 9.
232 BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 702.
233 Delali, Case No. IT-96-2 1 -T, Judgment, 1209-10.
234 Id. 1212. In another passage, the Trial Chamber also held that "[nullum crimen sine
lege] is founded on the existence of an applicable law. The fact that the new maximum
punishment exceeds the erstwhile maximum does not bring the new law within the
principle." Id. 1210.
235 Id. 1212 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995) ("Nationals of the
former Yugoslavia... were therefore aware, or should have been aware, that they were
amendable to the jurisdiction of national criminal courts .... ")); see also id. 1210 (holding
that "[t]his concept is founded on the existence of an applicable law. The fact that the new
maximum punishment exceeds the erstwhile maximum does not bring the new law within
the principle.").
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The Trial Chamber's analysis leads to two serious implications: the
first is a rejection of the prohibition against the use of analogy on the
discretion of international criminal adjudicators, and the second is an
explicit renunciation of the prohibition against imposing a greater penalty
than the one applicable at the time the crime was committed.236 While it
may be argued, in turn, that this weakens the lex stricta and lex praevia
attributes of nulla poena sine lege under international law, the better
inference to be drawn is that the Trial Chamber's analysis of the principle
should not be given serious weight as international precedent for
determining the international standard for nulla poena sine lege. First,
although it is addressing the question of penalties, the Trial Chamber's
discussion is in terms of nullum crimen sine lege. The Trial Chamber's
failure to adequately distinguish between the two maxims weakens its
authority as precedent on the nulla poena sine lege inquiry. Second, the
Trial Chamber's dismissal of the lex stricta principle can be criticized for
failing to consider, even nominally, the international precedent arising from
the Advisory Opinion on the Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative
Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City.237 It may be said that to
some extent this criticism can be deflected by the fact that traditionally
resorting to analogy was permitted on a limited basis, but this counter-
argument has less force in light of modern practice of criminal law. With
the exception of one or two isolated states, national criminal justice systems
prohibit the expansion of criminal sanctions by analogy. Yet, even if
breach of the lex scripta principle was to be deemed acceptable in
international criminal justice, the Trial Chamber's analysis is liable to an
even more serious criticism. Contrary to the well-established principle of
lex praevia in international and national law, the Trial Chamber concluded
that a "new punishment" which is "greater than the former punishment does
not offend" the principle of legality.238
In light of the sentences imposed, it seems quite unnecessary for the
Trial Chamber to reach such controversial conclusions. In this case, the
Trial Chamber acquitted one defendant on all charges, and imposed
imprisonment sentences of seven, fifteen, and twenty years on the other
three. Hazim Delic, who received the harshest penalty of twenty years
imprisonment, argued that, based on the principle of legality, the Trial
Chamber could not impose a sentence greater than fifteen years.239 Indeed,
236 It may be countered that these proffered implications constitute a "worse case"
critique of the Trial Chamber's analysis; nevertheless, it is the logical conclusion of the Trial
Chamber's holdings.
237 Danzig Decrees, supra note 121.
238 Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1212 (emphasis added).
239 Id. 1211.
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the standard maximum under the former Yugoslavia's penal code was
fifteen years.240  However, as already mentioned, under certain
circumstances national courts could increase the penalty to twenty years.
These include cases where the death penalty was applicable but for some
reason, such as mitigating circumstances, the court chose to not impose it
and cases where "criminal acts ... were perpetrated under particularly
,,24 1aggravating circumstances or caused especially grave consequences.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber did not need to go so far as to engage in a
controversial analysis which could call into question its judgment or
damage the credibility of international judges, or even cast a shadow on the
endeavor to fight impunity through international criminal justice. It could
simply have reasoned that Delic's crimes were of such gravity as to fall
within the provisions of the former Yugoslavia's penal code, which
permitted an increase in penalty from fifteen years to twenty years.
The Celebi~i Appeals Chamber appropriately refrained the analysis in
terms of nulla poena sine lege.242 More significantly, it also focused the
issue towards whether nulla poena sine lege required an international
criminal tribunal to be bound by the penalties available under national
law.243  The Appeals Chamber steered clear of any overreaching
declarations such as those made by the Trial Chamber that "[t]he fact that
the new punishment of the offence is greater than the former punishment
does not offend the principle., 244 This could arguably be considered as an
implicit disavowal of the Trial Chamber's ruling on this point. After
limiting the inquiry to whether nulla poena sine lege required strict
adherence to national law, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the penalty
of life imprisonment authorized by the ICTY Statute and RPE did not
violate the nulla poena principle because it reasoned that "the accused must
have been aware" that their crimes were "punishable by the most severe
penalties. 245  Thus, the Appeals Chamber limited its holding, and
consequently the rulings of the Trial Chamber, by the principle of
foreseeability. Citing decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
the Appeals Chamber reasoned that so "long as the punishment is accessible
and foreseeable, then the principle cannot be breached.,
246
240 See supra note 161.
141 elebii Case, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 7810 n.1383 (Feb. 20, 2001)
(referring to Article 38 of the SFRY Penal Code).
242 Id 814.
243 Id.
244 Delali, Case No. IT-96-2 1 -T, Judgment, 1212.
245 CelebiOi Case, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, 817.
246 Id 817 n. 1400 (citation omitted). The Appeals Chamber here relied on two cases
from the European Court of Human Rights: C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92,
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The difficulties in applying the foreseeability test in this context have
been addressed above already.247 It is fair to say that it was foreseeable that
serious violations of international humanitarian law would be subject to the
"most severe penalties," as the Appeals Chamber pointed out.248 However,
in a country that had abolished life imprisonment as a cruel form of
punishment, can it fairly be said that such a sanction was foreseeable? In a
country that did not permit terms of imprisonment beyond twenty years on
the fundamental belief that such imprisonment was cruel and inhumane, it
would be fair to argue that sentences of twenty years,249 forty years,2
forty-five years, 251 or forty-six years2 52 were not foreseeable.
C. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE IN THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
1. ICC Statute Framework for the Legality of Sanctions
Under Part III of the ICC Statute on General Principles of Criminal
Law lies Article 23, the keystone to understanding the legality of the ICC's
power to impose a particular punishment. 3  Entitled "Nulla poena sine
lege," Article 23 states: "A person convicted by the Court may be punished
only in accordance with this Statute. 254 Although at first glance this single
succinct sentence seems rather stingy for content, underlying its brevity are
335 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68-69 (1996), and S. W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41-42 (1996). However, in both of these cases, the central issue was the
"punishability" of the conduct, not the determination of the appropriate penalty. In other
words, the threshold question before the ECHR in both cases was the application and
interpretation of nullum crimen sine lege, not nulla poena sine lege. The foreseeability test
was applied to determine whether nullum crimen sine lege had been breached.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
248 Celebii Case, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, 817.
249 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Feb. 26, 2001),
aff'd, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment (Dec. 17, 2004).
250 Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999).
251 Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment (Mar. 3, 2000). For a critique
of methodology and reasoning of the Blagki6 sentence in light of the general sentencing
jurisprudence of the ICTY, see Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaki6 Sentence: Some
Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT'L CRIM. L.R. 321 (2004).
General Blagki6's sentence was reduced to nine years on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Blagki6,
Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (July 29, 2004).
252 See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001). Krstic's
sentence was reduced to thirty-five years on appeal. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-
33-A, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004).
253 For a general commentary on this Article, see Lamb, supra note 2, at 762-65;
Schabas, supra note 2, at 463-66.
254 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 23.
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important requirements for the legality of any selected sanction within the
ICC framework. First, the list of sanctions provided by the Statute is
exhaustive. If a particular punishment is not provided for by the Statute,
then the ICC has no power to impose it. Second, the language "only in
accordance with this Statute" obliges the ICC to comply with any
conditions, qualifications, or other requirements attached to any sanction,
whether in regard to its determination, imposition, or enforcement. From
this perspective, it may be said that the Statute reaffirms the lex scripta
principle underlying nulla poena sine lege.
While the inclusion of nulla poena sine lege via an individualized
article within the ICC Statute may be considered a positive contribution to
the development of the norm under international law, it must be admitted
that Article 23 contains a peculiar expression of its namesake. 5  The
principle is made dependent on the quality of provisions found in other
articles of the Statute, and in some cases even dependent on the ICC Rules
of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE). This reverse dependency is an
awkward and unfamiliar position for a fundamental principle of criminal
law, which is normally independent of subsequent rules. Put differently,
fundamental principles of the system, such as nulla poena sine lege, contain
norms and values that subsequent rules within the system must satisfy. The
dependency of the ICC's nulla poena sine lege provision on other articles
of the Statute may limit its effectiveness in achieving the goals associated
with the maxim, particularly those that pertain to its "positive justice"
function.
While Article 23 limits the form and severity of the punishment to
those penalties enumerated in the Statute, it cannot be said that it likewise
limits the factors, especially aggravating circumstances, that judges may
rely on to increase the severity of a sentence. Its effectiveness to limit
judicial discretion to the factors enumerated in the Rome Statute or the ICC
RPE is weakened by open-ended language in other articles and rules. For
example, Article 78 instructs judges to "take into account such factors as
the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted
person. , 216 The language suggests that the enumeration of factors here is
not exhaustive. Article 78 further states that the determination of the
sentence should also be in accordance with the ICC RPE. Rule 145,
255 At least one international judge has made a similar observation. See Prosecutor v.
Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94- 1-A & IT-94- 1 -Abis, Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese,
5 (Jan. 26, 2000) (observing that "Article 23 lays down the nullapoena principle, but only
in a particular form").
256 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 78(1) (emphasis added).
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however, contains a non-exhaustive list of aggravating factors.257 Thus, in
determining a sentence, judges may take into account "other circumstances"
not found in the Statute or ICC RPE 8.2 " This opening in the Statute has
been criticized as being contrary to nulla poena.259
Prior to the adoption of Rule 145, the potential scope of Article 23 was
a matter of interpretation for the judges. The threshold issue would have
been whether the language "in accordance with this Statute" requires that
the factors impacting the sentence be enumerated in the Statute or the RPE,
or whether it is permissible for the Statute or ICC RPE to allow
consideration of factors not enumerated. Rule 145 seems to lay this issue to
bed. However, can it be argued that the court has the authority, or even the
obligation, to ensure that rules adopted by the Assembly of State Parties, as
part of the ICC RPE, do not conflict with the fundamental principles laid
down in the Statute? In other words, does the ICC have the power of
judicial review over provisions adopted in the ICC RPE? This matter
cannot be addressed within the scope of this article, but perhaps there is
room to argue that this particular provision of Rule 145 is contrary to the
requirements of the Statute pursuant to Article 23.
Another factor contributing to the peculiar nature of the formulation of
nulla poena sine lege in Article 23 is the absence of language expressly
incorporating the lex praevia principle, which is codified in numerous
international and regional human rights instruments. From the perspective
of normative development of nulla poena sine lege in international law, it
would have been preferable to explicitly incorporate the lex praevia
principle in the ICC's nulla poena article, especially in light of some
potentially adverse statements from the jurisprudence of the ICTY.260
However, from a practical standpoint, its absence in Article 23 is not fatal
to the operation of the lex praevia principle within the general framework of
the Statute, provided that the Statute is interpreted consistent with Article
15(1) of the ICCPR. Moreover, it may be argued that the drafters of the
Statute did not consider this to be a serious omission given that the Statute
257 International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/I/3, Rule
145(2)(b)(vi).
258 Id. (granting that these "other circumstances" must "by virtue of their nature be
similar" to the enumerated aggravating factors).
259 SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 201
(2003). For similar criticism of the ICTY Statute, see BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11,
at 702.
260 E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 1210 (Nov. 16, 1998)
("The fact that the new maximum punishment exceeds the erstwhile maximum does not
bring the new law within the principle."); id. 1212 ("The fact that the new punishment of
the offence is greater than the former punishment does not offend the principle."); see supra
Part IV.B.
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contains a clear provision on the non-retroactive application of the Statute
to conduct occurring prior to its entry into force.26 1
Given that the ICC's nulla poena sine lege article does not explicitly
contain the lex praevia principle, namely that a heavier penalty shall not be
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offense was
committed,262 the court may have to turn outside its own statute for
authority to incorporate this principle.263 There are a number of sources that
the court can rely upon to incorporate the lexpraevia principle into its legal
framework, including "applicable treaties, 264 and "general principles of
law" derived from national laws of legal systems of the world.265 Although
it is hard to imagine that ICC judges would not incorporate lex praevia into
the nulla poena provision of the Statute, it would nevertheless have been
preferable to have included an explicit provision to that effect.
An earlier proposal, which was not included in the final text of
Article 23, offered the following language: "No penalty shall be imposed on
a person convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, unless
such penalty is expressly provided for in the Statute and is applicable to the
crime in question., 266 However, without explicit reference to determining
the penalty in accordance with the law applicable "at the time the conduct
was committed," the proposal does not address the lex praevia principle,
although it does provide for a stronger lex certa character which could have
possibly required that penalties be specified per crime. It is not clear why
the Working Group on Penalties reformulated the proposal into the present
language.267 Perhaps it was because the Working Group did not have
sufficient time to achieve a more precise sentencing framework. Whether
this decision will weaken the nulla poena norm within the ICC framework
remains uncertain.
To strengthen the lex praevia character of nulla poena within the ICC
framework, one could argue that the principle of non-retroactive application
261 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 24(1). The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002. Id. art. 126.
262 See supra Parts II.B & III.A. See generally UDHR, supra note 29, art. 11, 2;
ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 15(1); ECHR, supra note 29, art. 7(1); ACHR, supra note 29, art.
9.
263 See ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 21.
264 See id art. 21(1)(b). These may include for example international human rights
treaties as well as international humanitarian law conventions. With regard to the latter,
Article 75(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949
provides that "nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the
time when the criminal offence was committed."
265 See ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 21(l)(c).
266 See Schabas, supra note 2, at 465. This proposal was offered by Mexico.
267 Id.
[Vol. 99
2009] BEYOND RETROACTIVITY TO REALIZING JUSTICE 909
of a heavier penalty appears in all major human rights treaties. 26' This
argument, however, is only successful to the extent it is accepted that the
court is bound by these treaties. Another approach would be to turn to
general principles of law or customary international law, as the majority of
nations prohibit ex post facto application of criminal law. 269  A third
approach could be to rely on related articles of the Statute such as Article 22
and Article 24, although such reliance will also depend upon the
interpretation of these provisions in accordance with international human
rights standards. 270 Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege makes clear that the
applicable law is that which was in place at the time the conduct
occurred y. Given the nexus between nullum crimen sine lege and nulla
poena sine lege,2 72 the ICC may reasonably rely on Article 22 to incorporate
the lex praevia principle into Article 23. Article 24 also has potential to
strengthen lex praevia within the Statute, depending on the interpretation
given to the phrase "the law applicable." Article 24 provides that "[i]n the
event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted shall apply. 273 Strictly speaking, this provision
incorporates the lex mitior principle, but it can be interpreted so as to
include the lex praevia principle of nulla poena sine lege. The threshold
question to be resolved is what is meant by "the law applicable to a given
case." While at first glance this may seem obvious to some, the Statute
itself does not make explicit if "applicable law" refers to the law in force at
the time the conduct was committed or the law in force at the time the ICC
seized jurisdiction of the case. The Celebiki Appeals Chamber stated that
"any sentence imposed must always be . . . 'founded on the existence of
applicable law.', 2 74  However, the Appeals Chamber did not further
elaborate on how the "applicable law" should be identified and determined.
268 E.g., ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 15(1) ("Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."); see
supra Part ILA; see also ECHR, supra note 29, art. 7(1); ACHR, supra note 29, art. 9;
UDHR, supra note 29, art. 11, 2.
269 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 123.
270 Article 22 deals with nullum crimen sine lege and therefore speaks to punishability of
an act and not the punishment itself. Article 24(1) prohibits imposition of "criminal
responsibility" in relation to the temporal jurisdiction of the court.
271 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 22(1) ("A person shall not be criminally responsible
under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
272 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 396-97 ("The rationales that support precise written
rules governing assignment of liability and its degree apply as well to criminal sentencing.").
273 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 24(2).
274 Celebidi Case, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 817 (Feb. 20, 2001).
SHAHRAM DANA
Moreover, it made no negative judgment against the Trial Chamber's
approach which seemed to suggest that when the determination of
"applicable law," for the purposes of determining a penalty, is framed in
terms of a jurisdictional question, it is permissible to exceed the penalty
applicable at the time the crime was committed. In certain instances, this
could result in an ex post facto increase of the penalty. On the other hand,
an alternative reading of the combined rulings of the Trial Chamber and the
Appeals Chamber in Celebi6i would be that the ICTY has not endorsed ex
post facto increase of a penalty as such, but rather is saying that nullapoena
sine lege does not require an international criminal tribunal to be bound by
the penalty provisions arising from national law so long as the international
tribunal is acting in accordance with its own statutory provisions, even if
those provisions result in an increase in the penalty that otherwise would
have been applicable were the individual to be tried in the forum of the
locus delicti.275 It is one thing to say that nulla poena sine lege does not
require an international criminal court to be strictly limited to penalties
arising from national penal codes; it is an entirely different matter to
suggest that nulla poena sine lege under international law does not
encompass the lex praevia principle prohibiting retroactive application of
penalties. Put simply, regardless of what interpretation the ICTY chooses
to give to its national law provision, it cannot result in a sweeping ruling
that nulla poena sine lege in international law does not include the principle
of non-retroactivity. Such a holding would be manifestly against
international human rights treaties.
Accordingly, to the extent that the Celebidi Trial Chamber's ruling
suggested this latter consequence, it should be rejected as incompatible with
international human rights standards and fundamental principles of criminal
law. On the other hand, the former proposition arising from the combined
rulings of the Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber in Celebii has
significance for future cases before the ICC, and maybe also for the
interpretation of its nulla poena sine lege article. The upshot of the
Celebii case on the nulla poena sine lege question is to preempt any
success that the defendant may have in arguing that, where the penalty
provisions of the ICC are greater than the penalties allowed under national
law, the imposition of the former would violate the principle of legality.
The ICC can bolster its rejection of such an argument by, in addition to
references to the relevant articles of its own Statute, recalling this analysis
of the Celebidi case.276
275 This would be subject to the limitation that the penalties in the forum of adjudication
were foreseeable. Id. at 293 n.1400.
276 The ICC Statute does not contain a national law provision like the one found in the
statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. This makes sense in light of the differences in their
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A third peculiar aspect of the drafting of Article 23 pertains to its legal
construction which places "may" and "only" in close proximity: "may be
punished only in accordance with this Statute." It may seem too obvious to
argue that the textual and teleological interpretation of this language would
be that the court may, but is not obligated to (as opposed to "shall"), punish
a convicted person; however, if it chooses to punish, it can only do so in
accordance with the Statute. However as pointed out above, we have
witnessed the ICTY reject what leading scholars considered to be the
appropriate textual and teleological interpretation of its Article 24.277
Moreover, like the national law provisions of the ad hoc tribunals,27 8 which
followed on the heels of a more strongly worded provision regarding
applicable penalties, 27 9 Article 23 of the ICC Statute also follows the more
strongly worded Article 22, which states, inter alia: "A person shall not be
criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court., 280  The "shall not.., unless" formulation is a stronger legal
construction than the language of Article 23. Additionally, as noted
geographic reach. Because the ICTR and ICTY's jurisdiction is limited to crimes occurring
on the territory of a single (former) state, reference to national laws is defendable. In the
context of a permanent international criminal court, with the potential for global territorial
reach, a national law provision would result in a fragmentation of international sentence.
Some have expressed optimism that this will "build on the principle of equality of justice
through uniform penalties regime for all persons convicted by the Court." See Rolf Einar
Fife, Applicable Penalties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER'S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 985, 986 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999).
277 Compare Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/I-A, Judgment,
349(June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, 418 (Oct.
23, 2001); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-I-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment, 21 (Jan.
26, 2000); with BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 692, 700; Schabas, Perverse
Effects, supra note 97, at 524-28.
278 A comparison between ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 23, and the second sentence of
ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(1) (and ICTR Statute, supra note 149, art. 23(1)) seems
appropriate as it has been argued that the latter was included out of concern for respecting
nulla poena sine lege. See BASSIOUNI AND MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 692, 700; Schabas,
Perverse Effects, supra note 97, at 524-28. Except for the reference to the applicable state,
the provisions of ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(1) and ICTR Statute, supra note 149,
art. 23(1) are identical: "The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of [the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda]."
279 Compare the first sentence and the second sentence of ICTY Statute, supra note 8,
art. 24(1) ("shall be limited to" versus "shall have recourse to").
280 ICC Statute supra note 9, art. 22(1). For a general commentary on this article, see
Bruce Broomhall, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 276, at 447, 452-53.
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already, Article 22 also explicitly includes the lex praevia principle. It is
worth recalling that the national law provision of the ICTY statute also
contained unorthodox drafting.28 1 ICTY Article 24 uses "shall" alongside
"have recourse to," creating ambiguity as to its character as a strict legal
limitation on judicial discretion or as a lesser guiding, but not binding,
provision.8 2 ICTY judges concluded that the sentencing laws and practice
of the former Yugoslavia are not binding on them.283 Although it has been
argued that this provision was included out of concern for respecting the
nulla poena sine lege,28 4 the interpretations of the judges have effectively
read out this limitation on their discretion.8 5
In sum, some improvement has been made in comparison to the
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. Although sparse and not providing
satisfactory elucidation of the nulla poena principle, Article 23 infuses the
ICC sentencing regime with a significant lex scripta quality, which may
have in turn inspired the state representatives at the drafting table to
produce what has been characterized as the most progressive international
sentencing code. Moreover, the fact that nulla poena sine lege is
recognized in its own right under Article 23, separate and independent of
nullum crimen sine lege (Article 22), should serve to give the norm
additional weight and embed its position in international criminal law.28 6
2. Analysis of Imprisonment Sanctions
The penalty provision proposed by the International Law Commission
in its draft statute for an international criminal court was nearly identical to
the penalty provisions of the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY Article 24 and ICTR
Article 23), and relied upon the same general criteria as found in the
sentencing provisions of the ICC Statute.8 7  In the view of many
delegations, this ILC draft provision
281 See supra Part IV.B.
282 See also BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 700.
283 This position was taken from the outset in the ICTY's first sentencing judgment. See
Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Judgement, 39 (Nov. 29, 1996). It has
been confirmed and followed without deviation, entrenching it deep in the Tribunal's
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, 349 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment,
418 (Oct. 23, 2001); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment,
21 (Jan. 26, 2000).
284 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 702; Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra
note 97, at 525; Schabas, supra note 2, at 464.
285 See supra note 194.
286 And, hopefully, encourage more scholarship on this subject.
287 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
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gave rise to a serious problem with regard to its conformity with the principle nulla
poena sine lege. It was generally held that there was a need for maximum penalties
applicable to various types of crimes to be spelled out. The view was also expressed
that minimum penalties should also be made explicit in view of the seriousness of the288
crimes.
With regard to imprisonment sanctions, Articles 23 and 77 work in
tandem. Article 77 sets out the ICC's powers regarding the sanction of
imprisonment. It gives the court two alternatives: judges must make a
choice between imprisonment of not more than thirty years 289 or life
imprisonment. This structure resulted from the insistence of states for
clarity as to the maximum sentence, 29 a recognition of the lex scripta and
lex certa attributes of nulla poena.291 The idea to include a maximum term
for a sentence of determinate years originated with France and other civil
law countries in order to, in the view of one participant, 292 "increase legal
certainty with regard to the range of imprisonment. 2 93  Consequently, a
degree of specificity was introduced into international criminal justice that
did not exist in the statutes of previous international criminal tribunals.2 94
Under the statutes of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTR and ICTY, a person could be
sentenced to forty years or fifty years or any other period of time.295 The
(1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 287, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (providing that "[ijn imposing sentence, the Trial Chamber
should take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.").
288 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 50 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 36, 187, U.N. Doc.
A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report].
289 Proposals on the maximum years for a specific term of imprisonment ranged from
twenty to forty. See Fife, supra note 276, at 990 n.24.
290 Id. at 1424; see also Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS 319, 319
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999)
291 Further indicia of this recognition can be found in the support of some countries for
the inclusion of minimums as well as maximums. See ICC Prep. Committee's 1996 Report,
supra note 27, at 63; see also Compilation of Proposals, supra note 101, at 227-34;
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Decisions
Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from I to 12 December 1997, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997); United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-17, 1998,
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, arts. 75-79, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add. I (April 14, 1998).
292 Rolf Einar Fife (Norway), Chairman of the Working Group on Penalties.
293 Fife, supra note 276, at 990.
294 Compare ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 77, with ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24,
and ICTR Statute, supra note 149, art. 23.
295 E.g., General Radislav Krsti6 was sentenced to forty-six years of imprisonment. See
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 726 (Aug. 2, 2001). On
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ICC Statute, however, does not provide precise penalties for specific
crimes, despite the wide range of offenses and modes of participation that
the court is called upon to judge. Thus, the sentencing scheme in Article 77
applies to all crimes within the ICC jurisdiction.
When determining a sentence within this structure, judges must take
into account two factors: "gravity of the crime" and "the individual
circumstances of the convicted person., 296 In the practice of the ICTY, the
"gravity of the crime" emerged as the key factor in sentencing,297 and the
ICC's reliance on it to produce a just sentencing practice should not be
underestimated. "Gravity of the crime" appears as the key criterion in two
places in the Statute. Under Article 77(1)(b), "gravity of the crime" is
relied on to determine the appropriateness of life imprisonment. At
minimum, the "gravity of the crime" must be "extreme" in order to justify
life imprisonment. It appears again in Article 78(1) as a general factor in
determining the appropriate length of any sentence.
3. Life Imprisonment
Article 77(1)(b) provides two general qualifications intended to limit
the application of life imprisonment. Life imprisonment should only be
imposed "when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person." Both criteria must be
met before an individual can be sentenced to life imprisonment. There are
no crimes for which the Statute categorically excludes the applicability of a
life sentence. Consequently, even with the intended limitation in Article
77(l)(b), life imprisonment is theoretically applicable to all the crimes
within the Statute.
A life imprisonment sentence is, to state the obvious, a severe
29sanction. 98 The drafting and negotiation process revealed a notable divide
between some states on its propriety. Several European and Latin
American countries opposed, in principle, the inclusion of life
imprisonment within the ICC's statute, and at minimum, its imposition
without the possibility of parole.299 Some states viewed life imprisonment
appeal, his sentence was reduced to thirty-five years. See Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-
98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, 87 (Apr. 19, 2004).
296 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 78(1).
297 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Appeal Judgment, 731 (Feb.
20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 182 (Mar.
24, 2000).
298 For further reading on life imprisonment, see DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE
IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).
299 See SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 141; Fife, supra note 276, at 990.
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as cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. 300 As such, in their view, it
violated provisions of international human rights treaties.30 ' Other states
disagreed, stressing the importance of including severe penalties within the
ICC's power because the penalties under consideration were to be applied
to the most serious crimes of international concern.30 2 Accordingly, they
supported the inclusion of life imprisonment and, in the case of some states,
the death penalty, "as a prerequisite for the credibility of the International
Court and its deterrent functions. ' '30 3  Thus, on the question of which
penalties should be placed under the ICC's authority, the views among the
states ranged from those who supported the inclusion of death penalty to
those who argued against life imprisonment.
Given this diversity in views, it is perhaps surprising that further
efforts were not made in the Working Group on Penalties to make
appropriate distinctions among the range of crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction as to the applicable penalty for each, or at the very least, to
identify those crimes for which a life sentence would be excluded. Instead,
a compromise was made excluding the death penalty, but allowing for the
sanction of life imprisonment which would be generally applicable to all
crimes and levels of culpability, albeit with the qualification found in
Article 77(1)(b). While this clause arguably places a formal limitation on
the imposition of life imprisonment, its undefined quality has the potential
to betray the aim of consistent application.
4. Statutory Provisions Advancing the Nulla Poena Norm
The Statute contains several articles which serve to strengthen its
compliance with nulla poena sine lege. As illustrations, three of them will
be discussed here. The first is a mandatory review procedure; the second
pertains to specific rules regarding sentencing in the case of multiple
convictions; and finally, the third covers sanctions for offenses against the
administration of justice.
i. Mandatory Review of Sentences
The inclusion of a mandatory review mechanism was inspired by
concerns regarding the ICC's authority to impose the sanction of life
300 SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 141.
301 The view that life imprisonment is unacceptable from a human rights perspective
remains contentious. The majority of states allow for it. For further reading, see Schabas,
supra note 59, at 461.
302 Fife, supra note 276, at 986-87.
303 Id.
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole.3 °4 In the final text of the
ICC Statute, however, it was made widely applicable to all imprisonment
sentences. The procedure is laid out in Article 110, which places upon the
court a legal obligation to review the sentence after a specified period of
time.305 It provides the convicted person with legal certainty that his or her
sentence will be reviewed for possible reduction. Thus, the Statute gives
rise to a right of the accused to a review of his sentence during the
execution phase. Significantly, these provisions represent an effort to
improve the lex scripta and lex certa qualities of international sentencing by
extending legal certainty into the enforcement stage. Thus, the ICC Statute
extends the reach of the nulla poena sine lege maxim to execution of
penalties. In the context of the ICTY, early commentators on the statute
concluded that nulla poena sine lege applies to the execution of sentences,
although they did not elaborate on how they reached this conclusion.30 6
Indeed, a modern approach to nulla poena sine lege, which appreciates that
it functions more than simply as a principle prohibiting the imposition of a
penalty heavier than the one applicable at the time the offense was
committed, supports the position of these authors. In its first sentencing
judgment, the ICTY held that "[t]he principle of nulla poena sine lege must
permit every accused to be cognisant not only of the possible consequences
of conviction for an international crime and the penalty but also the
conditions under which the penalty is to be executed., 30 7 Interestingly, the
Trial Chamber's rationale for its holding appears to not be premised so
much on nulla poena's protectionist function but rather its "quality of
justice" function: "[T]he Trial Chamber is concerned about reducing the
disparities which may result from the execution of sentences. 30 8 On the
other hand, where the analysis of nulla poena is limited to its lex praevia
principle, some commentators have argued that it "applies only to the
'penalty' imposed, not to the manner of its enforcement. Hence, it does not
prevent any retroactive alteration in the law or practice concerning the
parole or conditional release of a prisoner., 30 9 In light of such varying
opinions among human rights scholars, it is regrettable that the formulation
'04 Id. at 988.
305 For a general commentary on this article, see Gerhard A.M. Strijards, Review by the
Court Concerning Reduction of Sentence, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 276, at 1197, 1197.
306 E.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 692.
307 Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 70 (Nov. 29,
1996).
308 id.
309 E.g., D.J. HARRIS, M. O'BOYLE & C. WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 281 (1995); cf Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,
70.
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of nulla poena sine lege within the ICC framework did not explicitly codify
lex praevia into Article 23.310
While the genesis of Article 110 lies in making available the
possibility of parole, the language of the final draft of the article also creates
a minimum penalty on a case by case basis. Although the sentencing
regime of the ICC does not have explicit minimum sentences, neither
generally nor per crime, Article 110(3) prevents the court from reviewing a
sentence for possible reduction prior to the execution of two-thirds of the
sentence or twenty-five years in the case of life imprisonment.
ii. Specific Rules for Multiple Convictions
Particular rules regarding sentencing in cases of multiple convictions
are provided for in Article 78(3),311 thereby strengthening the lex certa
characteristic of the Statute's sentencing provisions. It contains two
mandatory features that are important to compliance with nulla poena. The
first pertains to the obligations of the ICC when imposing a sentence for
multiple convictions. "When a person has been convicted of more than one
crime," Article 78(3) requires the court to first "pronounce a sentence for
each crime" individually. The court "shall" then also pronounce a joint
sentence "specifying the total period of imprisonment." This requirement
marks an improvement on a fainrant practice that had developed in some
trial chambers of the ICTY and ICTR to simply provide only a single
overall sentence without enumerating specific sentences for each
conviction. It has been widely assumed that the RPE of the ad hoc tribunals
authorized the practice of rendering a single sentence3 12 at the time it was
introduced in the Blaki6 case. 313 Although General Bla§ki was convicted
of multiple crimes, the Trial Chamber did not render multiple sentences,
opting instead for the less distinctive approach of rendering a single
sentence for all crimes.314 To justify its departure from the then existing
practice of other ICTY trial chambers, the Blakik Trial Chamber curiously
turned to Rule 101 and observed that it "does not preclude it from passing a
310 See supra Part IV.C(1).
311 See Mark Jennings, Determination of the Sentence, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 276, at 999, 999-1004.
312 This is sometimes referred to as a "global" sentence.
313 Prosecutor v. Bla§ki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 805-07 (Mar. 3, 2000)
(noting that "until now the ICTY Trial Chambers have rendered Judgements imposing
multiple sentences"). For a commentary on the sentencing analysis of the BlaWkic Trial
Chamber, see Dana, supra note 251. See United Nations, www.un.org/icty (last visited Mar.
3, 2008) (containing a full text of all ICTY judgments cited herein); 4 ANNOTATED LEADING
CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 477-667 (Andrd Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds.,
2002) (containing a full text of the Blagki6 judgment, along with notes and commentary).
314 Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 807.
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single sentence for several crimes. 3 15 At the time, however, Rule 87(C)
did preclude the Trial Chamber from passing a single sentence for multiple
crimes and it is quite egregious that the Trial Chamber did not even mention
this Rule.3 16 Rule 87(C) required the Trial Chamber to impose a sentence
with respect to each finding of guilt: "If the Trial Chamber finds the
accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in the indictment, it
shall at the same time determine the penalty to be imposed in respect of
each finding of guilt. '31 7 Thus, when the Blagkid Trial Chamber introduced
the practice of single sentencing, it did so in contravention of the ICTY
RPE.3 18 Subsequently, following two revisions of the ICTY RPE, the Rules
caught up to reflect the practice of single sentencing, and Rule 87(C) was
319
amended to allow the imposition of single sentences for multiple crimes.
The lack of transparency resulting from a single sentence approach
undermines the criminal justice process in several ways. For example, it
leaves the Appeals Chamber without any indication of how each conviction
influenced the overall sentence in the event that one conviction is
overturned. Likewise, both the accused and the prosecution are placed at a
disadvantage when seeking to challenge a sentence on appeal. This is
particularly concerning for the accused, whose right to an effective appeal is
thereby undermined. Accordingly, this first feature of Article 78(3),
obliging the court to render a sentence for each crime in addition to an
overall sentence reflecting the total period of imprisonment, strengthens the
lex certa principle of nulla poena in connection with sentencing before the
ICC.
The second feature places mandatory limitations on the outer ranges of
the imprisonment period. Article 78(3) mandates that the total period of
imprisonment "shall not exceed 30 years," or, alternatively, life
imprisonment, provided that the requirements of Article 77(1)(b) are
"' Id. at 805.
316 See ICTY RPE, supra note 155, R. 87(C).
317 Id.
3 18 Not only has the BlaWkic Trial Chamber relied on the wrong rule, it has also relied on
case law that is not on point. After acknowledging that the practice of ICTY trial chambers
has been to render multiple sentences, it relied on two ICTR cases to justify its decision to
violate the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence and deviate from ICTY practice. The
two ICTR cases relied on were not even factually or procedurally similar to qualify them as
relevant authority since both resulted from guilty pleas by the defendant, which may provide
more justification for a single sentence. In any event, a factually and procedurally irrelevant
case from another tribunal can hardly serve as sufficient grounds for the Bla§ki Trial
Chamber to ignore its own rules of procedure as well as depart from existing practice at the
ICTY.
319 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, R. 87(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Dec. 13, 2000).
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satisfied. At the other end of the spectrum, the total period cannot be less
than the highest individual sentence imposed.
3 20
Thus, Article 78(3) strengthens the Statute's compliance with the nulla
poena sine lege principle in at least two ways. First, by providing a
sentencing provision dealing directly with multiple convictions, state parties
to the Rome Treaty have signaled recognition in principle that such matters
should be addressed in the constitutional framework of an international
penal court as required by lex scripta, the codification requirement of nulla
poena. By incorporating this rule within the Statute itself, the drafters have
further protected the value of legal certainty by preventing a trial chamber
from departing from the rules that an accused can reasonably expect to rely
on, and subsequently burying its breach under layers of revisions to the
rules of procedure and evidence. Here, a clear improvement is evidenced in
the ICC Statute over the statutes of its predecessor tribunals, which were
silent on the issue. Next, it sets statutorily codified limits on the terms of
imprisonment in the event of multiple convictions, thereby moving towards
better fulfillment of lex certa. To the degree possible given Article 77's
own shortcomings on lex certa, Article 78 provides a measure of clarity and
predictability in sentencing situations involving multiple convictions.
iii. Legal Authority for Sanctions Relating to Contempt of Court
The sanctions set forth in Article 77 are applicable only to a "person
convicted of a crime referred to in article 5 of this Statute., 321 Therefore, it
does not empower the court to impose sanctions for contempt of court,
misconduct, or offenses against the administration of justice, which must
likewise satisfy nulla poena sine lege pursuant to Article 23. The ICC's
authority and the limitations regarding these sanctions are provided for in
Articles 70 and 71. Article 70 sets out a range of offenses relating to the
obstruction of justice322 and provides a specific penalty provision
authorizing the ICC to impose a maximum of five years imprisonment.
323
Interestingly, the ICC's authority to impose sanctions for what can be
generally considered contempt of court could have easily been left to the
judges to develop under the doctrine of inherent judicial powers.324 The
320 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 78(3).
321 Id. art. 77(1).
322 Id. art. 70(1)(a)-(f).
323 Id. art. 70(3) (providing that the court may also impose a fine).
324 The ICTY and ICTR statutes did not contain provisions dealing directly with
contempt of court and its corresponding sanctions. For a commentary on select decisions of
the ad hoc Tribunals on contempt of court, see Shahram Dana, The Law of Contempt Before
the UN ICTR, in 10 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
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inclusion of these specific provisions indicates a strict approach, by the
drafters of the Statue, to nulla poena sine lege in the Article 23. The judges
ought to rely on this teleological perspective when determining the general
nature of the nulla poena norm while developing the ICC sentencing
practice.
5. Shortcomings on Compliance with Nulla Poena Sine Lege
There can be little doubt that the ICC Statute represents a marked
improvement over the statutes of its predecessor courts when it comes to
provisions on sentencing. A certain degree of respect for the principle of
legality, nulla poena sine lege, must be acknowledged within the ICC
structure. But does it go far enough? If criticism were to be entertained, or
put differently, if areas for improvement through possible future
amendments are to be considered, the Statute's primary weakness lies in its
satisfaction of the lex certa requirement of nulla poena, namely that
penalties should be specific and precise, thereby providing a sufficient
degree of legal certainty. This shortcoming is typified in two
compromising characteristics of the Statute's sentencing provisions-
generality and ambiguity: "generality" because it lacks sufficient
distinctions between penalties for the variety of crimes within its
jurisdiction, and "ambiguity" because it relies on vague sentencing criteria.
i. The Problem of Generality: All for One and One for All
The problem of generality appears at two levels. At the level of
application, the "gravity of the crime" serves as a determinative criterion
both in the specific application of life imprisonment 32 5 and also in the
general determination of any term of imprisonment.326 At the framework
level, the ICC Statute contains a single sentencing scheme, with alternative
maximums, applicable to any and all offenses under its jurisdiction. In
other words, either maximum can be applied to all crimes, including
inchoate crimes, and all modes of participation. The ICTY and ICTR
statutes, which likewise did not provide specific penalties for particular
crimes or categories of crimes, were criticized for not satisfying nullapoena
sine lege. The ICC Statute is likewise open to the same criticism.3 27 This
framework departs from the example of most national criminal codes,
which establish a precise penalty range for individual offenses. Thus,
278 (Andr6 Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 2006); Taru Spronken, Commentary, in 7
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra, at 225,225.
325 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 77(1)(b).
326 Id. art. 78(1).
327 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 689.
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measured against the practice of states, the ICC sentencing provisions lack
sufficient precision and specificity.
This is particularly disconcerting in relation to life imprisonment. The
general applicability of the most severe sanction to all crimes within the
ICC's jurisdiction compromises the lex certa requirement and ultimately, it
must be admitted, encroaches on the accused's right to legal certainty.128 It
is tempting to justify this failure on the grounds that further agreement
among states on specific penalties could not be reached. While it is true
that states are sharply divided on issues surrounding the death penalty, and
even to some extent, the propriety of life imprisonment, this explanation is
not entirely satisfying.
First, given the range of crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction and forms
of individual participation,329 some degree of separation can be made as to
the severity of the sanction applicable. At a most basic level, for example,
offenses against property and offenses against life can be distinguished.
There is a hierarchy of interests protected by international crimes including
the interest of the international community in the existence of groups of
people, the interest in freedom from terror and persecutory acts, the interest
in individual life, the interest in bodily integrity, the interest in cultural
property, and so on.330 The interests protected are distinguishable, as is the
mode of participation, the criminal intent, and the harm committed.
Therefore, appropriate distinctions must likewise be made in applicable
penalties. Second, the difference between states on specific philosophical
concerns, such as the propriety of the death penalty, has been unnaturally
stretched into a perceived general disagreement on theoretical
methodologies useful for distinguishing penalties. All states make general
distinctions between offenses against property and offenses against a
328 For example, in the event that an accused pleads guilty to a crime, he has no certainty
about the upper limits of penalty he will face, and his lawyer cannot provide sufficient legal
advice on the matter.
329 For the purposes of punishability of conduct, the Statute recognizes both completed
crimes and inchoate crimes. It further recognizes that individual participation in crimes can
take on different forms. See ICC Statute, supra note 9, arts. 25, 28.
330 The scope of this comment does not permit further elaboration on the question of
hierarchy of crimes in international law. Various proposals have been made based on
different methodologies for creating a hierarchy. For further reading, see Pickard, supra
note 17 (advancing a comparative analysis of the same or comparable crime in the domestic
law of twelve states); Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offense in
International Criminal Law, 51 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 583 (2002) (proposing a ranking scheme
based on combining both gravity in abstracto and gravity in concerto); Allison Marston
Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87
VA. L. REV. 415 (2001) (proposing a hierarchy of crimes based on an abstract assessment of
harm combining the substantive elements of the crime with its jurisdictional elements in the
chapeau).
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person, between commission and attempt, and between different mental
states. Third, reports from the preparatory meetings reveal a lot of political
jockeying, which was the root of much disagreement.331 Many delegates
took the position that they could not discuss other sentencing matters until
the issues surrounding the death penalty were resolved. This tactic was
motivated by concerns pertaining to national interests and a firm intent to
protect a state's sovereignty in applying particular penalties domestically
without prejudice arising from the provisions of the ICC. It had marginal
relevance to reaching agreement on distinguishing between various offenses
in terms of severity and, unfortunately consumed precious time in which
issues such as hierarchy of crimes, criminal intent, mode of participation,
and resulting harm could have been discussed in relation to applicable
penalties. In addition to these hindrances, there appears to be some
cavalier, if not misplaced, confidence that, since we are dealing with the
most horrible crimes, the most severe penalties will be applied. The
reasoning is attractive; yet, the actual practice betrays that presumption.
The practice of the ICTY in particular is littered with instances of lenient
penalties.3 32  Thus, the implicit presumption (that we give the harshest
penalties anyway) behind the indifference towards the need for an advanced
sentencing regime is simply unsustainable and can no longer be accepted as
a tacit reason for not advancing international sentencing law.
ii. The Problem of Ambiguous Criteria: Between the Most Serious Crimes
and Extremely Grave Crimes
The ICC Statute contains two dangerously ambiguous criteria for
determining a sentence: "gravity of the crime" and "extreme." They
strongly resemble the language of general guidelines or "benchmarks" in
standard setting international treaties; yet they are not functionally intended
as such. They carry a much weightier role within the ICC sentencing
framework. The Statute has elevated these benchmark provisos to the level
of legal criteria. The question thus arises whether "gravity of the crime"
331 Schabas, Penalties, supra note 97, at 1533.
332 E.g., Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 134
(Feb. 27, 2003) (imposing only eleven years imprisonment on a high-ranking leader indicted
for genocide and convicted of crimes against humanity). For a critical analysis of undue
leniency in sentencing by the ICTY, see Shahram Dana, A Turning Point in International
Criminal Justice, in 11 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 962, 962 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2007); see also Milanka Saponja-
Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, July 24, 2003,
http://www.iwpr.net/?p-tri&s=f&o=1 64725&apcstate=henitri2003 (noting the local
reactions).
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and "extreme" qualify as legal criteria and whether they can adequately
satisfy nullapoena sine lege.
333
Reliance on the phrase "gravity of the crime" to generate a fair and
consistent sentencing practice is beset with many difficulties. First, the
Statute does not rank the gravity of crimes within its jurisdiction. Second,
the phrase is not defined anywhere in the Statute. Third, the phrase is open
to varying interpretations, each being legally tenable but leading to different
outcomes, and thus resulting in inconsistent sentences. The ICC forum is
particularly vulnerable to this danger because its judges are drawn from
diverse legal, political, philosophical, and cultural backgrounds. From case
to case, accused to accused, the composition of judges will change
dramatically and randomly. Fourth, despite one author's hopes to the
contrary,334 the sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR is not
sufficiently developed or coherent to provide meaningful, consistent
guidance on interpretation and application of this concept. A major culprit
here is the "single" or "global sentencing" practice of the ad hoc tribunals in
case of multiple convictions which has inhibited the maturation of
sentencing norms in international criminal justice.335
The problem of ambiguity also arises in the method of distinguishing
between the application of life imprisonment sentences and sentences for a
333 Curiously, these criteria were challenged as being contrary to nulla poena sine lege
more than fifty years ago, when a 1951 proposal of the International Law Commission for
the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind employed a similar
criteria ("gravity of the offense") for the determination of penalties. See Schabas, Perverse
Effects, supra note 97, at 523-24.
334 See Jennings, supra note 311, at 1436 (asserting that "[t]he sentencing jurisprudence
of the ICTY and the ICTR will provide the Court with useful guidance on the comparative
gravity of the crimes" (emphasis added)). Regrettably, his reliance on a brief quote from one
ICTR case (Kambanda) is insufficient for such a grand assertion. In broad strokes, the
Kambanda merely states that crimes listed under the category of war crimes are not as
serious as those under the heading of genocide and crimes against humanity. Even judges at
the ICTR consider this inadequate to provide meaningful guidance. See Prosecutor v.
Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment & Sentence, 812 (Feb. 25, 2004)
(expressing concern "that the practice of awarding a single sentence for the totality of an
accused's conduct makes it difficult to determine the range of sentences for each specific
crime"). Moreover, his analysis does not draw upon any case law from the ICTY to support
for his assertion. In fact, the jurisprudence of the ICTY rejects hierarchy set out in
Kambanda, and thus, far from providing any such "useful guidance," there exists some
inconsistency between the ICTY and ICTR rulings. Other commentators on this issue have
strong reservations as to whether the case law of the ad hoc tribunals will provide any
substantial utility on sentencing matters for the ICC. See Danner, supra note 330, at 501;
Pickard, supra note 17, at 137; see, e.g., Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 367 (2005).
335 Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment & Sentence, 812 (expressing
concern "that the practice of awarding a single sentence for the totality of an accused's
conduct makes it difficult to determine the range of sentences for each specific crime").
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fixed period of time not to exceed thirty years. The inclusion of this
separation may be viewed as an improvement upon the statutes of the ad
hoc tribunals which contained no limitation on sentences for a term of
years. However, what was gained in terms of legal certainty by the
inclusion of a maximum for non-life sentences was largely taken away by
the statutory criteria for making the distinction. The Statute informs us that
the difference between life imprisonment and thirty years lies somewhere
between "extreme gravity of the crime" and "gravity of the crime." The
notion of "extreme" is an insufficient criterion; it is vague and general at
best, and superfluous at worst, given that the ICC is intended to deal with
the "most serious" crimes in the first place.336 Paradoxically, with its
optional approach to maximum penalties combined with ambiguous criteria
for selection, the ICC sentencing structure arguably results in less legal
certainty. Furthermore, an accused, who is contemplating pleading guilty to
a charge, has no legal certainty as to which of the alternative maximum
penalties will be applied. Additionally, the challenge of applying these
criteria to make necessary distinctions at sentencing is further aggravated by
the constant rhetoric that the ICC was created to deal with only the most
serious and gravest of crimes. This over-inflation comes at the cost of
meaningful analysis. While the ICC is intended to deal with only serious
crimes committed in grave contexts, all crimes within its jurisdiction are not
of equal gravity.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the most fundamental rights of an individual is the right to
liberty. Therefore, any institution vested with power to deprive persons of
their liberty must exercise that power in accordance with basic human rights
and fundamental principles of criminal law. Nulla poena sine lege is
among the chief guardians of this right. Examining nulla poena sine lege
through its underlying legal principles aids our understanding of its role and
potential contribution to international justice. The general picture that
emerges after examining treaties, custom, and general principles of law is
that lex scripta, lex certa, lex stricta, and lex praevia are part of the
international standard for nulla poena sine lege. The latter legal principle
has been explicitly codified in numerous international and regional human
rights treaties. International courts have held that these provisions represent
a nulla poena sine lege standard that embodies more than a prohibition of
retroactive application of a heavier penalty, but also includes the prohibition
336 See ICC Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. At least one commentator points out that "[t]he
curious reference to 'extreme gravity of the crime' may seem out of place, since the Court is
designed to try nothing but crimes of extreme gravity." SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 141.
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of analogy in selecting a penalty, the requirements of legal certainty, and
the obligation to clearly define penalties.337 Furthermore, all four legal
principles underlying nulla poena sine lege constitute general principles of
law recognized in the majority of world's legal traditions. 338 State practice,
in the context of their domestic legal systems, evidences strong adherence
to these principles. Moreover, the views expressed by states in international
forums indicate that these principles also apply to international criminal
justice.
The time is ripe for international justice to grow out of its adolescence
and develop into a mature legal system.3 39  There are positive signs of
movement in this direction. For example, the ICC Statute requires the court
to first pronounce a sentence for each crime individually before rendering
an overall sentence in the case of multiple conventions. This hopefully puts
a stop to the practice of single sentencing which has greatly inhibited the
maturation of international sentencing norms. Likewise, despite the fact
that the ICTY freely employed the use of analogy in its sentencing analysis,
lex stricta still received positive recognition in international law through the
Rome Treaty of the ICC. These developments further bolster the view that
the ICTY's approach on these matters was not in keeping with the
international standard for nulla poena sine lege.
There are general signs of increasing appreciation that nulla poena sine
lege is not only a principle associated with negative rights but can also
contribute greatly to positive justice in international criminal law.
Adherence to nulla poena sine lege can serve to achieve the aim of
consistency in sentencing. It can also remove, or significantly limit, the
influence of arbitrary factors in the determination of a penalty. While the
administration of criminal justice has made great advances over the past
half century, the problem of emotive influences on punishment remains
even today, both domestically and internationally.34 °
337 See supra Parts III.A and III.C-D; see also Danzig Decrees, supra note 121; Ba~kaya
v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, Judgment, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, 36 (1999).
338 GALLANT, supra note 39, at 243-46; Bassiouni Study, supra note 69.
339 To achieve this would naturally require progress on other fronts besides international
sentencing, for example, on matters pertaining to enforcement and police powers. In the
context of international prosecutions, it would mean loosening its dependence on state
authorities for the execution of basic police powers such as investigations, arrests of
suspects, and seizure of evidence and assets.
340 The abusive practices that appear to be on the rise in the name of "fighting against
terrorism" remind us of the dangers of unchecked powers. In the context of international
criminal prosecutions, emotive influences may be suspected in the sentencing of Duiko
Tadi6. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14, 1997).
Although a relatively minor figure according to the Trial Chamber's own assessment, Tadi6
had the misfortune of being the first defendant to arrive at the ICTY. While not suggesting
that his twenty year sentence was unjust per se, it was harsher treatment than that imposed
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The penalty provisions of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, and ICTR attracted
criticism in legal commentaries for not meeting the requirements of nulla
poena sine lege. 341 While the sentencing practice of international tribunals
can hardly be characterized as an "abuse of power," the absence of a more
complete approach to nulla poena, by both judges and drafters of statutes,
has harmed the quality of justice rendered by the ICTY and ICTR.342 The
sentencing practice gives the appearance of an inconsistent body of law, or
at least a jurisprudence that provides little guidance to the ICC. Too often,
sentences imposed from case to case appear irreconcilable, especially where
low level perpetrators are punished more severely than their superiors.
Although the ICC sentencing provisions mark an improvement over
their counterparts in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals to the extent that the
ICC Statute contains a clear ceiling on sentences for a term of years, the
ICC provisions nevertheless continue to carry the fundamental weaknesses
of the earlier statutes-generality and ambiguity-into the most recent code
for international criminal justice. They do not provide specific maximums
for particular crimes or categories of crimes and they rely on ambiguous
criteria. Sentencing frameworks that rely almost entirely on general notions
like "gravity of the offense" without providing further guidelines must be
seen as relics of a nascent period in international war crimes prosecutions.
In the ICC sentencing provisions, particular concern surrounds the
consistent application of life imprisonment. The qualification of "extreme
gravity of the crime" is too elastic to satisfy the lex certa requirement of
nullapoena, especially given the severity of the sanction.
The execution of penalties has been touched upon in this Article but
has not been discussed in detail due to space limitations. Given that the
ICC and other international criminal tribunals lack their own permanent
penitentiary systems, an issue worthy of further exploration is the role and
relevance of nulla poena sine lege to the execution of penalties issued by
international criminal courts. Here again, the nature of the discussion will
differ depending on whether the analysis is focused only on the negative
on others with similar criminal culpability who came later and perhaps even more severe
than the sentences imposed on other war criminals with more blood on their hands.
341 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 11, at 689 (exploring that the imprecision of
the penalty provisions of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals violates nulla poena sine lege);
Fife, supra note 276, at 987-88; cf Schabas, supra note 59, at 469.
342 Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683 (2007) (expressing concern regarding low sentences by the ICTY
and the systematic inconsistency and discrepancy when compared to the length of sentences
at the ICTR).
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rights dimension of nulla poena sine lege or whether its positive justice role
is also considered.34 3
It is in light of its positive justice role that nulla poena sine lege has
much to contribute to legitimacy and justice in international sentencing.
What little consideration commentators have given to the nulla poena
principle has focused on its traditional role, namely its negative rights
dimension, and in particular on the issue of retroactivity. If the discussion
is to continue to be limited to this perspective, then indeed all the fuss over
nulla poena is "difficult to understand., 344  On the other hand, if we
broaden our discourse on nulla poena to embrace its positive justice
function, such as ensuring equality before the law, consistency in
sentencing, and justice in the distribution of punishment for mass atrocities,
then we might realize it still has much to offer to international criminal
justice.
343 For ICC provisions governing enforcement of sentences, see ICC Statute, supra note
9, arts. 103-10. In light of the fact that diverse states will carry out the execution of the
sentences and that the conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the
enforcing state, the ICC and the judges will need to exercise oversight to ensure equal
treatment of convicted persons when it comes to conditions of detention, parole, or pardon.
344 See Schabas, supra note 59.
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